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Abstract 
Nord Stream 2 has sparked an unprecedented amount of discussion within the 
European Union. Its proponents see it as a crucial and welcomed addition to the 
European energy infrastructure, while those opposing it consider the pipeline a 
geopolitical tool of Russia. This division has centred especially around Germany and 
the eastern Member States, Poland and the Baltic States in particular. This thesis 
adopts a qualitative approach and utilises tools from discourse and argumentation 
analyses to provide an in-depth analysis of the intra-EU debate on Nord Stream 2. 
The source material used is a large variety of different EU documents ranging from 
parliamentary questions to different types of official reports. The debate is found to 
feature arguments from three dimensions: environmental, economic and political. 
The central argument advanced is that the EU is less divided on the topic of Nord 
Stream 2 than has been commonly argued, especially in the media. The EU’s internal 
debate has been dominated by those opposing Nord Stream 2 and support for the 
project is rarely voiced. Furthermore, all three main EU institutions – the European 
Commission, the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament – have 
voiced concerns over the pipeline project. The second main result of the analysis, 
achieved through the systematic classification of different types of arguments into 
the three dimensions, is that the pipeline project has been most commonly framed 
in a political context, with appeals to the EU’s core principles such as solidarity and 
diversification of energy supplies being some of the most important characteristics 
of the internal debate. This thesis supports earlier research on the EU-Russia energy 
relationship by highlighting the negative perceptions of Russia within intra-EU 
debate. However, this thesis also challenges the Russia-focused angle of analysis, as 
the analysed documents show that the debate has focused on internal issues of the 
EU. These results are highly interesting because they show that although Russia is 
undoubtedly tied to the EU’s energy policy, the real issues might be structural and 
go beyond just questions related to energy policy. 
  
Keywords: Nord Stream 2, European Union, Russia, energy strategy, gas pipeline, 
natural gas, Gazprom 
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1. Introduction 
 
Nord Stream 2 (NS2) has been a hot topic in European energy, security and foreign 
policy debate in recent years. The gas pipeline, currently under construction, runs 
from Russia to Germany and doubles the capacity of the existing Nord Stream (NS11) 
twin pipeline. The reason for the heated debate is clear: energy is a crucial input for 
countries’ industries and important to all inhabitants. Lack of secure supplies can 
not only hamper economic growth but endanger people’s health if, for instance, 
insufficient supplies cause problems with electricity production or heating. 
Moreover, as a fossil fuel, natural gas also attracts discussion for environmental 
reasons.  
NS2 has nevertheless attracted an unusual amount of attention both within the 
European Union (EU) as well as in broader public debate. In 2017, the Commissioner 
for Energy Union Maroš Šefčovič stated that “no commercial project has ever been 
so intensely debated as the Nord Stream 2 pipeline”2. Indeed, in this statement lies 
the controversy of the project: not everyone believes that the pipeline is a 
“commercial project” but instead a project that has political, geopolitical, and 
security related motivations. These perceptions are largely due to the fact that the 
pipeline is being built by Gazprom, the Russian natural gas giant whose largest 
shareholder is the Russian state. The tense relationship between the EU and Russia 
and the continued mistrust between the two actors has undoubtedly contributed to 
the controversy around the project. Nevertheless, there are also those who favour 
the pipeline within the EU. Thus, there have been conflicting opinions on the project, 
and whether NS2 is an economic or a political undertaking has indeed been 
repeatedly the topic of debates, news articles, as well as policy briefs.  
This thesis sheds light on the debate on NS2 within the EU between 2012 and 2018. 
It will give an overview of where and how the project has come under debate, who 
                                                             
1 Although the first pipeline is officially called Nord Stream with no numeral attached to it, to avoid 
any confusion, this thesis refers to the original pipeline as “NS1”.  
2 European Parliament (2017), ”Gazprom’s controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline”, At a Glance, 
European Parliamentary Research Service, p.1. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/608629/EPRS_ATA%282017%296
08629_EN.pdf. 
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are its supporters and opponents and how have the different EU institutions’ official 
lines changed as a result of the dynamics of the internal debate. In addition to 
outlining official stances, this thesis will analyse the contributions of individual 
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), as looking beyond the official 
statements of the institutions provides a better understanding of the debate and the 
division within the union. 
This thesis presents two main arguments. First, the division within the EU is actually 
a lot smaller than is portrayed in EU documents such as “Nord Stream 2 – Divide et 
impera again?”, policy briefs like “Nord Stream 2: Rule no more, but still divide” by 
the European Policy Centre, and news headlines such as “Nord Stream 2: Gas 
pipeline from Russia that’s dividing Europe”.3 This thesis will show that most of the 
arguments found in the analysed documents are against the project, and the major 
EU bodies – the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, the 
European Parliament4 – all express scepticism towards the project.  
The second main argument advanced is that while much of the public discussion 
relates to the external dimension of the pipeline – more specifically, the role of 
Russia – the arguments presented in the intra EU-debate relate more to internal 
questions. The most prominent arguments appeal to the EU’s core principles such 
as solidarity, and to the goals of the adopted energy strategy like diversification of 
supply sources. Although the Russia factor is implicitly tied to these internal issues, 
it is nevertheless an important result that the majority of the debate has focused on 
the EU, its strategies and its values. Thus, it is crucial to understand not only the EU’s 
external relations but also its internal dynamics in order to fully grasp the debate 
surrounding NS2.  
Although many of the arguments mobilised for and against the project are well 
accounted for in the existing literature, there has been no detailed and in-depth 
                                                             
3 European Commission (2017), ”Nord Stream 2 – Divide et impera again? Avoiding a zero-sum 
game”, European Political Strategy Centre. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/sites/epsc/files/epsc_-_nord_stream_-_divide_et_impera_again.pdf; 
Giuli, Marco (2018), ”Nord Stream 2: Rule no more, but still divide”, European Policy Centre. 
Available at: http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_8613_nordstream2.pdf?doc_id=2010; 
Buck, Tobias (2018), ”Nord Stream 2: Gas pipeline from Russia that’s dividing Europe”, Irish Times, 
21 Jul 2018. Available at: https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/nord-stream-2-gas-
pipeline-from-russia-that-s-dividing-europe-1.3571552.     
4 From here on, the Council, the Commission and the Parliament. 
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evaluation of them. This thesis thus represents a first attempt at providing a 
systematic classification of the different arguments and offers a thorough analysis 
of how they fit into the context of EU policies and external relations. The main 
research question – how is NS2 framed in intra-EU debate in the context of 
deteriorated EU-Russian relations? – is broken down into three separate questions 
in order for a thorough understanding of the debate to be achieved. These questions 
are:  
1. How can the arguments used in the debate be classified?   
2. How do these arguments and the more general classifications relate to 
broader EU policies? 
3. How do these arguments fit into the context of deteriorated EU-Russia 
relations? 
In order to answer these questions, this thesis adopts a qualitative approach, 
combining discourse and argumentation analyses, to provide an in-depth 
understanding of the debate around NS2. Before turning to the data and 
methodology used in this thesis, the next section will discuss the pipeline project 
and the current state of research.  
 
1.1. What is Nord Stream 2? 
NS2 is a 1230km-long offshore natural gas pipeline running on the seabed of the 
Baltic Sea. Like its predecessor, NS2 is a double pipeline with each pipe holding a 
27,5 billion cubic meter (bcm) annual capacity. For context, in 2017 EU countries 
imported some 360 bcm of natural gas in total;5 NS2 would thus be able to deliver 
approximately 15,3 percent of the EU’s import demand if used at full capacity. The 
construction of the pipeline started in 2018 and its expected completion date is at 
the end of 2019. The natural gas delivered through the pipeline will originate from 
the Yamal Peninsula, located in northwest Siberia.6 As seen from Image 1, apart from 
                                                             
5 European Commission (2018b), “Quarterly report on European gas markets”, Market Observatory 
for Energy, 10:4. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/quarterly_report_on_european_gas_mar
kets_q4_2017_final_20180323.pdf. 
6 NS2 AG (2019b), ”Project background”. Available at: https://www.nord-
stream2.com/en/pdf/document/4/. 
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its point of origin, NS2 runs mostly along the same route as NS1 and ends in 
Greifswald in Germany, where it continues as an onshore pipeline and connects to 
the German market and through that to the wider European gas network. The 
project is ran and the pipeline fully owned by Nord Stream 2 AG (NS2 AG), a 
company whose sole shareholder is Gazprom. Gazprom is a Russian energy giant 
whose majority owner is the Russian state. Five large European countries are 
participating in the financing of the project: Engie (France), OMV (Austria), Royal 
Dutch Shell (Great Britain/the Netherlands), Uniper (Germany) and Wintershall 
(Germany).7 
 
As stated by NS2 AG, the company has applied for permits from the five countries 
whose territorial waters or exclusive economic zones the pipeline passes through: 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden and Russia. At the time of writing this thesis, 
the company has received permits from all countries except Denmark, whose 
Energy Agency is yet to make a decision on the three routes proposed by NS2 AG.8 
                                                             
7 NS2 AG, 2019b; NS2 AG (2019c), “The pipeline at a glance“. Available at: https://www.nord-
stream2.com/en/pdf/document/198/. 
8 Astrasheuskaya, Nastassia (2019), ”Nord Stream 2 applies for third Baltic Sea route in two years”, 
Financial Times, 15 Apr 2019. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/8c665f36-5f7d-11e9-
a27a-fdd51850994c. 
 
Image 1: Route of Nord Stream 2 
Source: Gazprom (2017) 
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Furthermore, other countries of the Baltic Sea – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Poland, as visible in Image 1 – have been included in the consultation process.  
Although state ownership of Gazprom amounts to only slightly more than half of the 
company’s shares,9 this thesis adopts the view that Gazprom executes its activities 
in a way that is in line with the Russian government’s broader strategies related to 
domestic business, international trade and external political goals. This approach is 
justified as the relationship between the Russian state and its energy companies has 
been described in existing literature as “symbiotic” in that they “continuously 
collaborate with each other, offering mutual benefits” albeit sustaining “their own 
institutional characteristics”10. Natural gas has also been described as “the Kremlin’s 
political weapon”11, further highlighting the connection between the state and 
Gazprom. It is also noteworthy that the former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev 
held a position at Gazprom before becoming the first Deputy Prime Minister in 2014 
and that the current deputy chair of the management board is a relative of President 
Putin.12  
NS2 will double the capacity of the original NS1 twin pipeline. The two pipelines that 
comprise NS1 were inaugurated in 2011 and 2012. This project, too, received harsh 
criticism before, during and after its construction, although it did not rise to be a 
similar topic in EU debate. Whist’s study shows that arguments both for and against 
were fairly similar to those that are present in the debate concerning NS2.13 So too 
was the division line between Member States: Baltic States and Poland perceived 
NS1 to have political motivations through increased Russian leverage, while 
Germany and the Nord Stream consortium emphasised that NS1 provides much-
                                                             
9 Gazprom (2019), ”Shares”. Available at: http://www.gazprom.com/investors/stock/. 
10 Bilgin, Mert (2011), ”Energy security and Russia’s gas strategy: The symbiotic relationship 
between the state and firms”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 44, p.119. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2011.04.002. 
11 Bilgin, 2011, p.121. 
12 ”Factbox: Who is Dmitry Medvedev, Putin’s nominee for prime minister?”, Reuters, 7 May 2018. 
Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin-inauguration-medvedev-fa/factbox-
who-is-dmitry-medvedev-putins-nominee-for-prime-minister-idUSKBN1I817Y; ”Putin relative 
appointed to management of state gas giant Gazprom”, Reuters, 23 Mar 2018. Available at: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin-gazprom-idUSKBN1GZ273. 
13 Whist, Bendik Solum (2008), “Nord Stream: Not just a pipeline”, FNI Report, 15/2008. Available 
at: https://www.fni.no/getfile.php/132119-1469870364/Filer/Publikasjoner/FNI-R1508.pdf. 
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needed natural gas to Europe efficiently.14 Whist’s research shows that countries of 
the Baltic Sea also raised environmental issues in the debate, although these were 
mostly related to marine life rather than carbon emissions, on which this thesis will 
focus. Whist also argues that NS1 was a “test for intra-EU solidarity”15, much in 
similar vein that many opponents have framed NS2. The project was indeed 
controversial enough to warrant multiple academic studies on the discourse used 
and the framing of the project in national debates.16  
However, there are also important differences between the projects. The EU’s 
internal market has evolved, and new regulations and strategies have been adopted. 
A particularly drastic change has happened in the general political atmosphere in 
Europe after the inauguration of the original NS in 2011 and 2012, not least because 
of Euromaidan, the annexation of Crimea and the instability in eastern Ukraine. 
Russia’s role and influence in these events has led to the worst state of EU-Russia 
relations experienced since the Cold War; for instance, the biannual Russia-EU 
summit, started in 1997, has not taken place since January 2014.17 Thus, although 
the original pipeline also warranted some discussion and, indeed, a variety of 
concerns were voiced, the project attracted considerably less attention than its new 
sibling now under construction. 
Even though the pipeline has not been completed yet, NS2 has attracted a 
considerable amount of research and has been a popular topic especially for policy 
briefs. Vihma and Wigell have studied the project from a geoeconomic angle, arguing 
that NS2 reflects a geoeconomic strategy by providing “economic carrots” which 
                                                             
14 Whist, 2008. 
15 Whist, Bendik Solum (2009), “Nord Stream: A litmus test for intra-EU solidarity?”, Estonian 
Foreign Policy Yearbook, pp.75-123. Available at 
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/119288/valispol7610.pdf#page=75. 
16 E.g. on Polish discourse, see Bouvarovksi, Stefan & Konieczny, Marcin (2010), ”Landscapes of 
paradox: public discourses and policies in Poland's relationship with the Nord Stream pipeline”, 
Geopolitics, 15:1, pp.1-21. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/14650040903420362; on 
discourse by the Swedish media, see Fransson, Anna-Lisa S., Faldner, Ingemar & Lidskog, Rolf 
(2010), ”Framing issues and forming opinions: the Baltic Sea pipeline in the Swedish media”, 
European Spatial Research and Policy, 18:2, pp.95-110. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.2478/v10105-011-0015-y; on discourse in the Finnish government, see Itälä, 
Pekka (2008), ”’Meille tämä kaasuputki ei ole ulko- ja turvallisuuspoliittinen kysymys’ – Nord 
Stream –kaasuputkihanke Suomen lainsäädännössä ja eduskunnan puheenvuoroissa vuosina 2005-
2010”, Master’s thesis, University of Helsinki. Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10138/232868. 
17 Permanent mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union, “Russia-EU summits”. 
Available at: https://russiaeu.ru/en/russia-eu-summits. 
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motivate the benefitting actors to dismiss or play down what the authors call “threat 
scenarios”18. This is an interesting argument because the proponents of NS2 have 
indeed sometimes perceived those opposing the project to be exaggerating any 
potential threats of the pipeline. Furthermore, Vihma and Wigell highlight that NS2 
has the potential to undermine Germany’s leadership role within the EU, which can 
cause longer-term issues for the functioning of the union.  
Loskot-Strachota looks at NS2, EU policy formation and the role of private actors 
and businesses in that process.19 Loskot-Strachota offers a useful analysis of what 
NS2 could potentially mean for the structure of the European gas market in the 
future. She explores the possible increase in infrastructure and interconnector 
investment not only in Germany and other Western European states but also in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Interconnectors and reverse flows are important for 
establishing a truly connected intra-EU gas market, where natural gas can flow 
freely according to supply and demand. Unlike many other assessments of the 
project, which tend to focus on the European markets, Loskot-Strachota also looks 
at the project from Gazprom’s point of view. She marks that NS2 represents an 
important opportunity to Gazprom to defend its imports to Europe, especially in the 
context of domestic competition it faces from Rosneft and Novatek. This challenge 
is also recognised by Goldthau, who further argues that Gazprom’s European 
strategy can be understood as one that aims for flexibility of export routes.20 Indeed, 
he notes that the additional capacity of NS2 brings Gazprom’s total export capacity 
to Europe to some 100 bcm more than its current exports are, representing a 
marked overcapacity. It thus seems, as Goldthau concludes, that Gazprom is willing 
to take risks in its European strategy. In general, Goldthau’s research offers one of 
the most comprehensive assessments of the pipeline project, as it provides a 
                                                             
18 Vihma, Antto & Wigell, Mikael (2016), ”Unclear and present danger: Russia’s geoeconomics and 
the Nord Stream II pipeline”, Global Affairs, 2:4, p.378. Available at 
https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2016.1251073. 
19 Loskot-Strachota, Agata (2016), ”Nord Stream 2: policy dilemmas and the future of EU gas 
market”, NUPI Policy Brief, 2016-2. Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2378856. 
20 Goldthau, Andreas (2016), ”Assessing Nord Stream 2: regulation, geopolitics & energy security in 
the EU, Central Eastern Europe and the UK”, Strategy Paper 10-2016, King’s Russia Institute & 
Department of War Studies, Kings College London. Available at: 
https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/research/groups/eucers/pubs/strategy-
paper-10.pdf. 
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detailed look at the technical21, regulatory, as well as political dimensions of the 
pipeline. His study also includes commentary on South Eastern Europe, a dimension 
often overlooked in relation to NS2.  
The division between those who see NS2 as a purely commercial undertaking and 
those who see it as having political motivations is well recognised in the literature.22 
The generalized division line puts the investor countries – Germany, Austria, France 
and the Netherlands – on one side, and current transit countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe, as well as the Baltic States, on the other. Italy has opposed the 
project, although the Italian government has also discussed the possibility of Italian 
investments in the pipeline.23 Outside of Europe, the US has opposed the project 
fiercely. Thus another division line has been argued to have appeared in the ‘West’, 
with Germany and the US in particular having conflicting stances.24 Although the US 
has opposed the project from the beginning, it has recently adopted a tougher stance 
as, for instance, German companies involved in NS2 have been informed they could 
face sanctions by the US if they do not withdraw from the project.25 However, as the 
focus of this thesis is the intra-EU debate, the analysis of the role of the US as well as 
the arguments used in debates involving the US fall outside the scope of this thesis 
and shall not be analysed further.  
 
1.2. Data & methodology  
The documents chosen for analysis in this thesis were found in the EU institutions’ 
online document archives.26 For the time period 1.1.2012-31.8.2018, searches using 
the key words Nord Stream returned 321 documents, 81 of which were related to 
                                                             
21 It should be noted that this thesis is not a technical paper and any technical matters have been on 
purpose left unaddressed. Goldthau’s (2016) paper is an excellent starting point for a reader 
interested in this side of the project.  
22 Vihma & Wigell, 2016; Loskot-Strachota, 2016; Goldthau, 2016. 
23 Loskot-Strachota, 2016. 
24 Loskot-Strachota, Agata, Bajczuk, Rafal & Kardas, Szyman (2018), ”Nord Stream 2 divides the 
West”, OSW Commentary, number 273, 18 Jun 2018. Available at: 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary_273.pdf. 
25 Detrick, Hallie (2019), ”U.S. Threatens to Sanction German Firms Constructing Russian Gas 
Pipeline”, Fortune, 14 Jan 2019. Available at: http://fortune.com/2019/01/14/nord-stream-2-
sanctions/. 
26 The Council and the Parliament; document search at the Commission’s registry returned no 
results. However, the analysed documents also include material from the Commission.  
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the topic of this thesis. The high number of documents found unrelated to the topic 
of this thesis can be explained with the functioning of the archive search tools. As 
they return all documents that have the words Nord and/or Stream in the body of 
the text, the search results included documents relating to, for instance, Nord-Pas-
de-Calais, South Stream pipeline, and online streaming. While each document was 
checked to ensure all relevant documents are included in the analysis, the majority 
of the documents were disregarded in the analysis. Some additional documents 
outside of the EU institutions’ archives searches were also analysed, including a 
video recording of a plenary sitting at the Parliament’s Committee on International 
Trade (ITRE), some answers given to parliamentary questions, as well as EU 
strategy papers and legislations. The total number of primary sources used for 
analysing and understanding the intra-EU debate on NS2 is 105. Most of these 
documents are from years 2015-2018, and thus this thesis will mostly focus on these 
years.  
As the searches and selection of documents was done manually, some relevant 
documents might not have been discovered. This is assessed to be the case 
especially for those documents that might have included arguments in favour of 
increased gas imports from Russia. This is because these documents do not 
necessarily explicitly mention the term Nord Stream (2) as the project is perceived 
to be highly controversial. However, due to the limited nature of EU institutions’ 
archives search tools and the extremely large number of documents returned by 
using more general search terms, for instance, “gas” (835 documents found in the 
Parliament’s Plenary register alone), it was deemed appropriate to limit the search 
to the chosen key words. However, as this thesis utilises also other sources, such as 
the EU’s regulatory and strategy documents as well as documents from NS2, 
arguments in favour of the pipeline are assessed to be sufficiently captured. 
A further difficulty regarding the used data is the topical nature of this thesis, as this 
means that some documents are still inaccessible to the public. For instance, some 
documents found through the document search had parts of them concealed.27 It is 
                                                             
27 The topical nature of this thesis is very apparent from the response of the General Secretariat of 
the Council of the European Union to access request for document ST 10249 2017 INIT, 
“Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations on an agreement 
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also important to note there might be documents that are simply not retrievable 
even in a censored form.  
This thesis uses a variety of documents to analyse the intra-EU debate. The most 
interesting insight is provided by what could be described as the actual debate: 
parliamentary questions presented to either the Commission or the Council. These 
are questions that individual MEPs or groups of MEPs can present to the appropriate 
body, most often in writing. This is a key difference between the Parliament and 
national parliaments: MEPs mostly challenge the work done by the Commission or 
the Council instead of debating each other. Parliamentary questions tend to be short 
– only a paragraph followed by a few questions – but vastly informative for our 
purposes, as the tone is often critical and MEPs do not try to hide their opinions. 
Indeed, the parliamentary questions highlight how both those for and against NS2 
tend to be critical of the EU institutions’ actions regarding the project. Parliamentary 
questions are also quite clearly used as a platform for voicing opinions or concerns 
and some of the questions presented are rather rhetorical. This is a further reason 
why these questions provide insightful material for assessing the intra-EU division 
on NS2. An interesting feature of parliamentary questions is that albeit being 
statement-like in their structure, they often do not present justifications for their 
claims. The Council’s and the Commission’s responses to these questions have also 
been included in the analysis, although it is important to notice there are less of 
these than there are presented questions. This is because one answer can be 
addressed to multiple questions. Furthermore, these answers tend to only reiterate 
                                                             
between the European Union and the Russian Federation on the operation of the Nord Stream 2 
pipeline”, 2017 Jun 12, in which they stated that “…unauthorised disclosure of its [the document’s] 
content could be disadvantageous to the interests of the European Union or of one or more of its 
Member States The negotiations referred to in the requested document have not yet started. 
Disclosure of the information contained therein would impede the proper conduct of the 
negotiations and prejudice relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation. 
Should its internal views and negotiation strategy be made public before the opening of the 
negotiations, the position of the Union in such international negotiations would be seriously 
weakened. Disclosure of the document would therefore undermine the protection of the public 
interest as regards international relations. As a consequence, the General Secretariat has to refuse 
access to the document.” (private correspondence, 12 Mar 2019).  
27 Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) (2017 Sep 19), “AMENDMENTS 1 - 232 - Draft report - 
Recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the Eastern Partnership, in the 
run-up to the November 2017 Summit”, PE 610.603v01-00. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-
610.603+01+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN. 
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the Council’s or the Commission’s official stance, which is apparent in other 
documents, too. Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, the answers are a less useful 
source than the parliamentary questions.  
Another fertile source is amendment documents. These are documents which 
contain the amendments suggested by different MEPs to various reports. The 
amendment documents analysed in this thesis are from ITRE and the Parliament’s 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET). Like in parliamentary questions, in 
amendment documents MEPs clearly use the offered opportunity to suggest 
alterations and revisions to the final documents and voice their own critical opinions 
on the matter. While most suggested amendments are diplomatic enough to be 
included in the final document, some suggestions were so critical and sometimes 
contrary to the EU’s official line that it seems unlikely their author(s) ever thought 
they would pass. Like the parliamentary questions, this characteristic of the 
suggested amendments makes them an illuminating source of the different 
approaches to NS2 within the EU. Furthermore, in some cases comparison of the 
draft documents with the final document provides important insights into what kind 
of line the Committee is willing to take – a more critical or a more neutral stance, for 
instance. When analysing both parliamentary questions and suggested 
amendments, this thesis will mention the country of representation and political 
affiliation of the MEP related to the document. This is to give the reader a better 
understanding of the countries and parties most active in the debate. Furthermore, 
this highlights the fact that the division is indeed mostly apparent between Member 
States, not parties. It should be noted that those MEPs that are members of either 
AFET or ITRE will naturally appear more active in the debate on NS2, as they have 
more chances to express their opinions than those who are members of other 
committees.  
The rest of the analysed documents are various reports and opinions by different 
EU bodies, both drafts and final versions. This thesis also utilises information from 
the EU’s webpages and the union’s legislative documents in order to provide context 
and place the debate surrounding NS2 to the wider framework of EU strategy and 
policy. Furthermore, documents from NS2 AG’s webpage have been included to shed 
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light on the official project rationale and how this relates to the debate that has taken 
place within the EU.  
The documents analysed reflect the different contexts in which NS2 has been 
debated within the EU. The project has been the subject of many parliamentary 
questions and comes up in many documents by ITRE and AFET, which in addition to 
the Parliament’s plenary sessions have been the most important platforms for the 
debate on NS2. This highlights the interconnectedness of energy policy and foreign 
policy in the EU. It should be noted that not all the documents analysed deal 
exclusively with NS2. On the contrary, most documents, apart from the 
parliamentary questions, only mention the project in a paragraph or two. The fact 
that the project is mentioned by name in documents not directly dealing with NS2 
underlines the importance attached to it within the EU. 
This thesis looks at the period from 2012 to the end of 2018. The year 2012 was 
chosen as the beginning of the period because NS1 was completed early that year. 
However, as Gazprom and the investor companies signed the agreement on the 
construction of NS2 only in 2015, most documents analysed fall into the years 2015 
to 2018. Although 2019 is not included in the analysis, there have been important 
developments recently, which should be noted here in order to offer a complete 
picture of NS2. In early February 2019 it became clear that the French government 
no longer offered its full support to the project. It was confirmed that France was 
now in favour of the revised Gas Directive, which shall be introduced in more detail 
later, but stipulates, for instance, that there must be unbundling of supply and 
transmission for pipelines entering the EU even if they are owned by companies 
from third countries.28 However, only a day later, French President Macron and 
German Chancellor Merkel were stated to have found a compromise in supporting a 
version where EU oversight would increase but no power to block projects would 
be given to the EU. Furthermore, individual Member States would retain the power 
to decide whether to apply the amended rules.29  At the time of writing, the new 
                                                             
28 Meier, Albrecht, von Marshall, Christoph, von Salzen, Claudia, Herold, Frank & Schlandt, Jakob 
(2019), ”France now against Nord Stream 2”, Euractiv, 8 Feb 2019,  Available at: 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/france-now-against-nord-stream-2/. 
29 Keating, David (2019), ”Why did France just save Nord Stream 2?”, Forbes, 8 Feb 2019. Available 
at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/davekeating/2019/02/08/why-did-france-just-save-nord-
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directive is waiting to be formally approved by both the Parliament and the 
Council.30  
This thesis adopts a qualitative approach and presents an in-depth analysis of a wide 
variety of EU documents described above. Due to the diverse nature of the 
documents as well as the dual goal of both classifying arguments as well as looking 
at how they fit into the broader context of EU policy making and EU-Russia relations, 
this thesis will combine tools from discourse analysis and argumentation analysis.  
Discourse theory is a popular method within both sociology and politics. The field is 
vast and has multiple and sometimes conflicting strands of thinking. At their core, 
however, all discourse theories study how people think of and conceptualise the 
world around them. The study of political debate is complicated by the fact that 
especially when discussions are public and relate to sensitive topics such a security, 
many aspects are hidden on purpose. Discourse analysis is an especially attractive 
tool for analysing public debate as, keeping in line with the core of discourse theory, 
“[i]t does not try to get to the thoughts or motives of the actors, their hidden 
intentions or secret plans”31. Furthermore, as Wӕver argues, it is not necessarily 
important to understand hidden motives because any discourse, even dishonest 
one, still shapes the political environment by conditioning future moves.32  
As the focus is on the analysis of different types of arguments presented in the intra-
EU debate, it is natural that this thesis also utilises argumentation analysis. As 
summarised by Liakopoulos, “[t]he aim of argumentation analysis is to document 
the manner in which statements are structured within a discursive text, and to 
                                                             
stream-2/#3b1c40e76055; Bershidsky, Leonid (2019), ”No, France and Germany haven’t fallen 
out”, Bloomberg, 8 Feb 2019. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-02-
08/france-germany-haven-t-fallen-out-over-nord-stream-2-pipeline. 
30 European Commission (2019a), ”Energy Union: Commission welcomes tonight’s provisional 
political agreement to ensure that pipelines with third countries comply with EU gas rules”, Press 
release, Brussels, 12 Feb 2019. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-
1069_en.htm. 
31 Wӕver, Ole (2005), “European integration and security: Analysing French and German 
discourses on state, nation, and Europe”, pp.33-67, in Howarth, David & Torfing, Jacob (eds.), 
Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan: 
Basingstoke, p.35. 
32 Wӕver, 2005. 
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assess their soundness” 33. An argument consists of two types of statements, claims 
and justifications, the latter of which is used to support the former.34  Although this 
thesis will look at how arguments – both the claims and their possible justifications 
– presented in the debate on NS2 fit into broader EU policies, it will not go as far as 
to assess the soundness of these arguments, which is another aim of argumentation 
analysis. This is because in this thesis, the central question is more focused on 
priorities and contextualisation than the strength of the argument itself. 
Furthermore, evaluating the ‘soundness’ of an argument also implies a normative or 
at least a critical evaluation,35 the provision of which is not the aim of this thesis. 
Additionally, unlike some strands of argumentation analysis, this thesis does not 
attempt to assess whether arguments are built well; there is no discussion on the 
specific stages through which “rational resolution of a conflict of opinion is 
achieved”36. Although rarely its distinct focus, discourse analysis can also study how 
arguments are used. Discourse analysis tends to adopt a different approach to 
argumentation than argumentation analysis in that it places less emphasis on formal 
arguments and whether “a sequential order from premise to conclusion is 
imposed”.37 
Thus, discourse and argumentation analyses can function as complements: while 
discourse analysis aims to describe broader patterns and structures of discourse, 
argumentation analysis looks at how specific standpoints are supported.38 
Furthermore, argumentation analysis from a discursive approach places emphasis 
on the socio-historical components of the context,39 which, as shall be discussed in 
this thesis, are crucial to include in order to understand the debate on NS2. The 
special nature of the analysed documents also makes the combination of these two 
                                                             
33 Liakopoulos, Miltos (2011), ”Argumentation Analysis”, in Bauer, Martin W. & Gaskel, George 
(eds.), Qualitative Researching with Text, Image and Sound, SAGE Publications: London, p.156. 
Available at: https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781849209731. 
34 Liakopoulos, 2011.  
35 Van Rees, M. Agnes (2007), ”Discourse analysis and argumentation theory: the case of television 
talk”, Journal of Pragmatics, 39, pp.1454-1463. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2007.04.005. 
36 Van Rees (2007) drawing on van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004). 
37 Amossy, Ruth (2009), ”Argumentation in discourse: a socio-discursive approach to arguments”, 
OSSA Conference Archive, 1, p.2. Available at: 
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA8/keynotes/1.  
38 Van Rees, 2007. 
39 Amossy, 2009. 
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approaches highly relevant. For instance, as explained above, the parliamentary 
questions often do not include justifications for the arguments presented, making 
the combination of these two analyses useful.   
To summarise, this thesis uses a mixed qualitative approach and utilises tools from 
both discourse and argumentation analyses to understand the debate surrounding 
NS2. As highlighted above, the analysis does not attempt to find hidden motives 
behind discourse and does not provide a normative assessment of the rationality of 
arguments.  
It is crucial to note that this thesis does not equate discourse or arguments with 
action. It is a well-known fact that rhetoric does not necessarily lead into due 
measures. This can be either because political compromises need to be made or 
because the rhetoric was only meant as such in the first place. Analysing this, 
however, would require discovering hidden motives or using process tracing 
methods to achieve an understanding on how discourse leads into policies, both of 
which are outside the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, it is crucial to highlight that 
this thesis by no means takes the arguments presented by different actors at their 
face value – a great example of this is the stance taken by the Council, as shall be 
discussed towards the end of the thesis. Finally, it is important to highlight that this 
thesis does no attempt to analyse or evaluate the policy-making or legislative 
process within the EU. Although these topics shall be discussed in relation to NS2 
and its regulation, the focus of this thesis is the intra-EU debate and assessing the 
division the pipeline has caused within the union.  
The analysis of arguments was conducted in the following manner. After the 
identification of relevant documents, each document was read in order to get an 
understanding of the debate and discourse surrounding NS2. This initial scan 
revealed three main dimensions of the debate: environment, economics, and 
politics. This division is also supported by existing literature on the EU’s energy 
policy; for instance, already in 1995 Estrada, Moe and Martinsen identified all three 
dimensions as being important for the analysis of European gas markets.40 Other 
                                                             
40 Estrada, Javier, Moe, Arild & Martinsen, Kåre Dahl (1995), The Development of European Gas 
Markets: Environmental, Economic and Political Perspectives, Wiley.  
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dimensions are, however, also recognised in existing literature. For example, Leal-
Arcas and Wouters’ edited Research Handbook on EU Energy Law and Policy includes 
social and technical dimensions, too.41 Furthermore, Markgren has applied 
classifications of geoeconomics and geopolitics to study perceptions of NS2 in 
Sweden.42 However, the three-dimensional model including environmental, 
economic and political questions was assessed to be the best fit for this thesis on the 
basis of the initial analysis of the documents.  
After the three-dimensional division was chosen, the relevant documents were read 
again, this time looking closely at each argument and their justifications, classifying 
them into one of the three dimensions. Each argument was also tagged with a key 
phrase in order to identify repeated arguments within each dimension. For instance, 
for political arguments this description could be “solidarity” and for economic 
arguments “dominant supplier”. It is important to highlight that the analysis was not 
done using a key word search, as not all the documents necessarily include these 
specific phrases. Instead, the actual discourse and its implications were assessed in 
order to identify the relevant group for each argument. Keeping in line with the 
chosen methodology, discourse analysis was used to grasp the broader context 
while argumentation analysis provides tools for the analysis of individual 
arguments, allowing a thorough understanding to be developed. 
It is crucial to note that the classifications are non-exclusive and many arguments 
could fall into more than one category. Furthermore, most participants in the debate 
tend to utilise many different kinds of arguments instead of focusing on only one of 
the three identified dimensions. Thus, some documents and specific arguments will 
be referred to more than once. 
The central arguments have been visible both within the EU and in the media; 
opponents often appeal to solidarity and the EU’s strategic goals like diversification, 
while proponents of NS2 tend to quote, for instance, falling domestic EU natural gas 
production and volatility of liquefied natural gas prices. However, due to the topical 
                                                             
41 Leal-Arcas, Rafael & Wouters, Jan (eds.) (2017), Research Handbook on EU Energy Law and Policy, 
Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham. Available at: https://doi.org/10.4337/9781786431059. 
42 Markgren, Sarah (2018), ” Nord Stream 2 – A Pipeline Connecting Geopolitics and 
Geoeconomics?”, Master’s thesis, Swedish Defence University. Available at: http://www.diva-
portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1229509/FULLTEXT01.pdf. 
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nature of the project, there are no in-depth studies of the content of these 
arguments, how they relate to the EU’s policies and strategies, and how the debate 
has been framed within the EU. This thesis fills this gap in current literature by 
providing a systematic classification of the arguments, identifying most popular 
arguments, and showing how these relate to broader EU policies. This thesis will not 
focus on the evolution of the debate, mostly because the analysis revealed no shift 
in the arguments used during the six years covered. However, some of the 
developments and changes in the stances of the EU institutions will be noted and 
analysed.  
 
1.3. Structure 
This chapter has introduced the Nord Stream 2 project, presented the various kinds 
of documents that will be analysed to understand the debate surrounding the 
pipeline, and outlined the tools that will be used in that analysis. This chapter has 
also presented the three-dimensional framework which will be used to analyse the 
debate. The rest of this thesis is divided into four main chapters. The second chapter 
will present and analyse the context in which the debate on NS2 has taken place: 
EU’s energy market regulation and EU-Russian relations today. The three 
subsequent chapters each discuss one of the dimensions identified: environmental, 
economic, and political arguments. The order of the chapters was chosen on the 
basis that the two first chapters – environmental and economic arguments – are 
seen to build towards the political debate. Furthermore, based on the number of 
observations, the political dimension can be argued to be the most important one.  
The third chapter will thus look at the environmental arguments and focus 
especially on emission reduction targets and climate change action. This chapter will 
show that NS2 has not really been framed in the context of environmental 
arguments: the analysis discovered only a few documents explicitly supporting or 
opposing NS2 in environmental terms. The fourth chapter looks at the economic 
framing of the pipeline. Economic arguments have generally been attributed to the 
proponent side, as increased supply security and a more direct route to the German 
market is argued to increase efficiency and thus support economic activity better. 
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However, the chapter will argue that within the intra-EU debate, opponents of the 
project have also utilised economic arguments in order to support their case. The 
fifth chapter will discuss the political arguments. This chapter shows that the 
opponents of the pipeline have appealed to solidarity, regulation and EU strategy in 
particular. This result is mostly in tune with earlier research. The conclusion draws 
together the main results from each chapter and offers an in-depth view of the 
contextualisation of the NS2 debate within the EU. The central arguments advanced 
are that, firstly, the division in the EU is not as deep as would first appear, as there 
is a lot more opposition and a larger variety of arguments against NS2 than there 
are in favour of the project. Secondly, although NS2 and European natural gas 
imports are irrefutably connected to Russia, the main focus of the intra-EU debate 
has been internal issues, and the debate has focused on principles such as solidarity 
and diversification, not the external relationship with Russia directly.  
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2. Nord Stream 2 in the European context 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader with an understanding of how the 
NS2 project fits into the context of the European energy market regulation and 
strategy as well as the EU-Russian relationship. It is crucial to understand the 
environment in which NS2 is debated as it is reflected in many of the arguments 
made both for and against the project, as shall be shown in chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
Awareness of the European framework contributes to a better understanding of the 
general approaches the different EU institutions have towards European energy 
markets and natural gas imports from Russia. This chapter is divided into two parts. 
The first part focuses on the most important developments in the EU’s energy policy 
and also presents some key documents that are crucial for understanding the debate 
on NS2, as they arguably form the backbone of many arguments used. The second 
part gives an overview of the EU-Russian relationship and Russia’s role in the EU’s 
gas market. Understanding European perceptions of Russia will be helpful in 
understanding many of the arguments analysed in this thesis, as the tense Russian 
relationship is present in all three dimensions presented in this thesis: 
environmental, economic and political. 
 
2.1. European energy policy 
Naturally, NS2 falls primarily under the realm of energy policy. Energy policy is a 
shared competency of the EU and its Member States. Article 194 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union concerns energy and lays out the aims of the 
Union’s energy policy, which is to be executed “in a spirit of solidarity between 
Member States”43. The aims include ensuring the security of energy supply and 
promoting internal energy networks. However, member states retain the “choice 
between different energy sources and the general structure of its [member state’s] 
supply”44. Energy policy thus does not fall into the scope of the EU’s exclusive 
                                                             
43 ”Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union” (2016), Official 
Journal C202, 7 Jun 2016, p.134. Available at:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2016/oj. 
44 ”Consolidated version”, 2016, p.135. 
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decision-making capacity, causing tensions between national and supranational 
policies and goals. This tension between policy-making and policy-taking has been 
explored by many academics.45 The tension between the EU’s capabilities and 
national interests has been apparent in energy policy, too, for instance when the 
formation of an energy consortium representing all EU member states in 
negotiations with Russia was rejected due to some Member States’, like Germany’s 
and the Netherlands’, stakes in the Russian energy sector.46 
Under regular circumstances, new EU legislation is prepared by the Commission and 
approved by the Parliament and the Council in a process called ordinary legislative 
procedure.47 Both the Parliament and the Council have the opportunity to suggest 
amendments to the legislation drafted by the Commission. In the Parliament, 
decisions normally pass with absolute majority of votes cast as long as a minimum 
of one third of the MEPs are present at the vote. In the Council, passing of legislation 
proposed by the Commission is done through qualified majority voting (QMV), 
which is the most common voting method in the Council. Under QMV, legislation is 
passed if 55 percent of the Member States representing at least 65 percent of the 
total EU population support it.48 This contrasts with, for instance, sanctions policy, 
where unanimity is required. 
Energy policy, and energy security especially, have been high on the list of priorities 
in Europe in the 21st century. Energy security for Europe means supply security, in 
other words, “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable 
                                                             
45 See e.g. Börzel, Tanja (2003) "Shaping and Taking EU Policies: Member State Responses to 
Europeanization," Queen's Papers on Europeanisation, p0035, Queens University Belfast. Available 
at: https://ideas.repec.org/p/erp/queens/p0035.html; Schmidt, Vivien A. (2009) ”The EU and its 
Member States: From Bottom Up to Top Down” in Phinnemore, David & Warleigh-Lack, Alex (eds.), 
Reflections on European Integration, pp.194-211, Palgrave MacMillan: London. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230232839; Richardson, Jeremy (ed.) (2012), Constructing a Policy-
Making State?: Policy Dynamics in the EU, Oxford Scholarship online. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604104.001.0001; David, Maxine, Gower, Jackie, & 
Haukkala, Hiski (eds.) (2013), National Perspectives on Russia: European Foreign Policy in the 
Making?, Routledge: London.  
46 Casier, Tom (2013b), ”The EU–Russia Strategic Partnership: Challenging the Normative 
Argument”, Europe-Asia Studies, 65:7, pp.1377-1395. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2013.824137. 
47 European Union (2019), ”How EU decisions are made”. Available at: 
https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/decision-making/procedures_en. 
48 Council of the European Union (2018), ”Voting system”. Available at: 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/. 
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price”49, which could be threatened due to “disruption from countries from which 
the EU imports fuel, but also extreme weather, industrial hazards, cyberattacks, 
terrorism and hybrid threats”50. The beginning of the century witnessed electricity 
supply disruptions in Member States like Germany and Finland at the same time as 
electricity prices increased in many areas, moving energy questions back to the 
centre of the political agenda. Indeed, Aalto and Westphal argue that the efforts to 
create a European energy policy were a way of responding to growing energy 
concerns.51 An EU Energy Community secretariat was established in 2006 during 
the Austrian presidency of the Council of the European Union and the subsequent 
Finnish and German presidencies highlighted the importance of energy questions.52  
Since then, issues related to energy have only become more complex as a result of 
the growing concerns related to environmental impacts and emissions. 
Furthermore, the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent economic instability in 
Europe, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, and the growing trend of nationalism and 
protectionism have all complicated the energy landscape in Europe.  
As stated, at the heart of the EU’s energy policy is energy security. Despite energy 
security’s popularity as a topic for research and debate, there are still various 
approaches to the concept in the policy field, ranging from more technical 
perspectives to the “popular mantra that ‘energy security means different things to 
different people’”53. Ang et al., offer a comprehensive overview of the different 
approaches through a meta-study on the usage of the term and conclude that it is 
both dynamic and contextual with an expanding scope that now includes 
dimensions like environmental sustainability.54 Indeed, with the growing focus on 
                                                             
49 International Energy Agency (2019), “What is energy security?”. Available at: 
https://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/whatisenergysecurity/.  
50 European Commission (n.d. a), “Energy security”. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-security. 
51 Aalto, Pami & Westphal, Kristen (2007), “Introduction” in Aalto, Pami (ed.), The EU-Russian 
Energy Dialogue: Europe’s Future Energy Security, pp. 1-37, Ashgate: Hampshire. Available at: 
https://www.dawsonera.com/abstract/9780754686293. 
52 Pami & Westphal, 2007.  
53 Szulecki, Kacper (ed.) (2018), Energy Security in Europe – Divergent Perceptions and Policy 
Challenges, Palgrave Macmillan, p.v. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64964-1. 
54 Ang, Beng, Choong, Desmond, & Ng, Adam Tsan Sheng (2015), ”Energy security: definitions, 
dimensions and indexes”, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 42, pp.1977-1093. Available 
at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2014.10.064. 
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climate friendly policies, energy security has become increasingly intertwined with 
renewable energy sources and energy efficiency, as is clear from publications like 
those of Hafner and Tangliapietra and Mouraviev and Koulouri, for instance.55 
This focus on security is reflected in the surge in studies on securitisation of the EU’s 
energy policy.56 Although this thesis purposefully will not apply securitisation 
theory to the analysed documents, due to its popularity, the topic warrants a few 
words. The classical approach to securitisation was presented by scholars of the 
Copenhagen School, like Buzan and Wӕver, in late 1990s. It combines the realist 
school’s concept of security with security as a “speech act”, leading to “an 
intersubjective conceptualization of ‘security measures’”57. Despite its popularity in 
current debate – or perhaps because of it – the term has remained as one of 
conflicting interpretations. Securitisation has thus not become one, coherent theory, 
although more recently Balzacq has attempted to formalise securitisation as an ideal 
type through the systematic analysis of the various definitions of the term.58 
However, due to the various conceptualisations and approaches to the concept of 
securitisation, as well as the already extensive literature on securitisation in EU 
policy mentioned above, this thesis will not analyse weather the discourse on NS2 
displays securitisation. Instead, as iterated, the focus shall be on the different kinds 
of arguments and their contextualisation more broadly.  
Many authors attribute the fact that energy security re-entered the policy stage in 
particular to the 2006 and 2009 gas cut-offs that were the result of disputes between 
                                                             
55 Hafner, Manfred & Tagliapietra, Simone (2016), The Future of European Gas Markets: Balancing 
Act Between Decarbonisation and Security of Supply, Claeys & Casteels Law Publishers: Deventer; 
Mouraviev, Nikolai & Koulouri, Anastasia (eds.) (2019), Energy Security – Policy Challenges and 
Solutions for Resource Efficiency, Palgrave Macmillan. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-
030-01033-1. 
56 See e.g. Judge, A. & Maltby, T. (2017), ” European Energy Union? Caught between securitisation 
and ‘riskification’”, European Journal of International Security, 2:2, pp.179-202. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2017.3; or Szulecki (ed.), 2018; or Hofmann, Stephanie C. & Staeger, 
Ueli (2019), ”Frame contestation and collective securitisation: the case of EU energy policy”, West 
European Politics, 42:2, pp.323-345. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2018.1510197. 
57 Stritzel, Holger (2014), Security in Translation: Securitization Theory and the Localization of 
Threat, Palgrave Macmillan: London. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137307576. 
58 Balzacq, Thierry (2015), ”The ’essence’ of securitization: Theory, ideal type, and a sociological 
science of security”, International Relations, 29:1, pp. 101-113. Accessed at: 
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Russia’s Gazprom and Ukraine’s Naftogaz.59 Indeed, the introduction of the Third 
Energy Package (TEP) followed the 2009 cut-off. This cut-off was the result of a 
dispute between Gazprom and Naftogaz and resulted in the halting of gas deliveries 
through Ukraine for 13 days, hurting especially countries in Southeast Europe. TEP 
aims to “make the energy market fully effective and to create a single EU gas and 
electricity market”60. This, in turn, is expected to keep prices low and ensure security 
of supply. Crucially, TEP also introduced effective unbundling of the production and 
supply of energy, aimed at preventing “network operators from favouring their own 
energy production and supply companies”61. In other words, TEP has been designed 
to prevent the abuse of market power. 
As Loskot-Strachota has recently argued, the context of the EU’s internal gas market 
has changed significantly since the inauguration of NS1, with more flexibility being 
gained through market liberalisation and integration.62 In addition to TEP, this has 
been achieved with the help of the European Energy Security Strategy (EESS) and 
the Energy Union package. Szulecki argues that like TEP, the introduction of the 
EESS in 2014 can be attributed to an external cause, namely Russia’s aggressive 
foreign policy towards Ukraine.63 Youngs describes the EESS as having “an 
unprecedentedly geopolitical tone”64, which is not surprising seeing that the EESS 
explicitly states Russia is the key risk to European energy security due to its market 
power.65 EESS has five long-term key areas for action: increasing energy efficiency; 
increasing intra-EU production of energy; completing the internal market for energy 
and investing in further infrastructure; “speaking with one voice in external energy 
policy”; and “strengthening emergency and solidarity mechanisms” including better 
                                                             
59 E.g. Judge, Andrew, Maltby, Tomas & Sharples, Jack D. (2016), “Challenging reductionism in 
analyses of EU-Russia energy relations”, Geopolitics, 21:4, pp.751-762. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2016.1222520; Szulecki (ed.), 2018.  
60 European Commission (2011), ”Questions and answers on the third legislative package for an 
internal EU gas and electricity market”, Memo/11/125. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-11-125_en.htm?locale=en. 
61 European Commission, 2011. 
62 Loskot-Strachota, 2016. 
63 Szulecki (ed.), 2018. 
64 Youngs, Richard (2014), ”A new geopolitics of EU Energy Security”, Carnegie Europe. Available at: 
https://carnegieeurope.eu/2014/09/23/new-geopolitics-of-eu-energy-security-pub-56705. 
65 European Commission (2014), ”European Energy Security Strategy”, COM(2014) 330 final, 
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coordination between member states.66 Furthermore, EESS highlights that there are 
numerous Member States which import 100 percent of the consumed natural gas 
from Russia and calls for diversification (and support for it). However, it should be 
noted that this also includes countries like Finland which, although it indeed imports 
all of its natural gas from Russia, also relies much less on natural gas in its energy 
mix than some other Member States. Nevertheless, diversification and the building 
of interconnectors and infrastructure are underlined as important actions for 
achieving a secure energy market.  
The latest substantial development in the EU’s energy policy is the Energy Union 
package. The Energy Union was introduced in 2015 and has been described as a 
holistic approach to the EU’s energy policy and especially renewable energy.67 
Furthermore, at least on a conceptual level the Energy Union has Europe-wide 
support, which facilitates the development of a shared policy platform.68 The annual 
State of the Energy Union report, most recently published in April 2019, lays out the 
progress in achieving the goals of the Energy Union, which include familiar topics 
like energy security, competitive and affordable prices, and climate-related 
targets.69 The first report on the Energy Union is the earliest official document by an 
EU body specifically referring to NS2 analysed in this thesis. It should be noted that 
a formal Energy Union has not yet been established; instead, it is currently being 
built through new infrastructure, policy work, and legislation. Nevertheless, these 
changes in the regulatory and strategic environment mean that NS2 is built and 
debated in a different context than its predecessor. 
 
2.2. EU-Russia relations & energy trade 
Despite the progress that has taken place internally in the EU’s energy markets, it is 
the EU-Russia relationship that has changed most drastically since the inauguration 
                                                             
66 European Commission, 2014. 
67 Szulecki, Kacper (2016), ”European energy governance and decarbonization policy: learning 
from the 2020 strategy”, Climate Policy, 16:5, pp.543-547. Available at:  
https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2016.1181599. 
68 Szulecki, 2016. 
69 European Commission (2019b), ”Fourth report on the State of the Energy Union”, Brussels. 
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/fourth-report-state-of-
energy-union-april2019_en_0.pdf. 
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of NS1. Additionally, due to Gazprom’s close relationship with the Russian state, as 
laid out before, it is thus crucial to pay attention to the current EU-Russian 
relationship in order to understand the controversy of NS2. Furthermore, it is 
essential to understand how the EU’s policies are partly a sum of its Member States’ 
policies, and how the different perceptions and shared history with Russia affect 
those policies. The following discussion does not attempt to provide an in-depth 
discussion on EU-Russia relations or EU policy formation – indeed, these are topics 
on which multiple books could be and have been written.70 However, the next part 
will give a summary of the relationship and especially its energy dimension in recent 
years to provide context for this thesis and to allow the positioning of the NS2 debate 
into the bilateral relationship of the EU and Russia.  
Russia’s importance for the European energy policy can hardly be overemphasised. 
In 2017, Russia’s gas and oil exports to the EU accounted for 38,5 percent and 29,9 
percent of the value of all extra-EU imports of gas and oil respectively.71 Graph 1 
below presents the shares of the EU’s natural gas imports by country of origin 
(measured in value). It is clear that Norway and Russia are by far the most important 
supplier countries to the EU. Russia’s importance for the energy landscape is well 
recognised and there have been attempts to institutionalise the relationship 
through, for instance, EU-Russia energy dialogue launched in 2000 and EU-Russia 
Gas Advisory Council established in 2011.72 Judge, Maltby and Sharples argue that it 
is exactly energy that lies “[a]t the heart of the current tensions and the attempts to 
develop a strategic partnership” between the EU and Russia. 73  
 
                                                             
70 On EU-Russia relations, see for example Haukkala, Hiski (2010), The EU-Russia Strategic 
Partnership: The Limits of Post-Sovereignty in International Relations, Routledge: London; Forsberg, 
Tuomas (2016), The European Union and Russia, Palgrave: London; Maass, Anna-Sophie (2017), EU-
Russia relations, 1999-2015: From Courtship to Confrontation, Routledge: Abingdon, Oxon. On EU 
decision making, see for example Vesrluis, Esther, van Mendeltje, Keulen & Stephenson, Paul 
(2011), Analyzing the European Union Policy Process, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, New York; 
McCormick, John & Olsen, John Spencer (2014), The European Union: Politics and Policies, 5th ed., 
Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado; Lelieveldt, Herman & Princen, Sebastiaan (2015), The Politics of 
the European Union, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
71 Eurostat (2018), ”EU imports of energy products – recent developments”. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/EU_imports_of_energy_products_-
_recent_developments.   
72 Judge et al., 2016. 
73 Ibid., p. 752. 
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Graph 1: Natural gas imports to the EU by country of origin, 2017 
 
The historical trend of natural gas imports from Russia can be seen from graph 2. As 
shown, the share of the value of Russian gas from total natural gas imports has 
remained fairly stable between 2012 and 2018, ranging between 37 percent  and 
slightly more than 42 percent. However, two things are noteworthy. First, even 
though the value of Russian imports as a share of total natural gas imports has not 
increased much, in absolute numbers imports have increased from 77,7 million 
tonnes in 2012 to 92,6 million tonnes in 2017.74 Secondly, as the EU’s domestic 
Graph 2: Share of Russian natural gas from total EU gas imports, 2012-2018*, 
measured in value 
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production has been decreasing in the 21st century, the EU’s dependency rate75 has 
increased, as shown in graph 3 below. It can thus be concluded that the EU’s 
dependency on Russian natural gas has in recent years also increased despite the 
EU’s prioritisation of diversification of supply sources.   
Graph 3: Energy dependency rate, natural gas, 2012-2016 
 
Although this thesis focuses on the EU, it is useful to understand the context 
provided by the Russia-focused research. Although the interdependency of the EU 
and Russia is well established, much of the literature focuses on the EU’s 
dependency on Russian fuel imports. This stems at least partly from the mere 
definition of “energy security”, which is often understood as a consumer-focused, 
thus in this case Eurocentric, term.76 However, there is also a growing literature 
discussing Russian energy strategy, Russia’s dependency on fuel revenues as well as 
demand dependency on the EU; for instance, the EU has accounted for about 60 
percent of Russia’s gas exports in recent years.77 Indeed, as presented earlier, there 
are a few studies on NS2 and its role in Gazprom’s European strategy, too.  
                                                             
75 Energy dependency rate ”shows the extent to which an economy relies upon imports in order to 
meet its energy needs” and simplified is calculated by dividing net imports with energy 
consumption”; Eurostat (2010), “Glossary: Energy dependency rate”. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Energy_dependency_rate. 
76 Sharples, Jack D. (2013), ”Russian approaches to energy security and climate change: Russian gas 
exports to the EU”, Environmental Politics, 22:4, pp.683-700. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2013.806628.  
77 Sharples (2013), Judge et al. (2016). 
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Sharples states that in the short term, the largest threat to Russia’s energy security 
– here demand security, in contrast to the EU’s supply security – is the development 
of the EU’s internal market, which can challenge Russia’s current position on the 
European market. This is reflected, for instance, in Russia’s attempts at receiving a 
special status for pipelines originating from Russia; Russia has also hinted at 
appealing to WTO to challenge the legitimacy of TEP.78 In the longer term, Sharples 
argues that it is climate-change action policies that posit a growing concern for 
Russia. Here it is not only the EU’s policies but also those by Asian export 
destinations like China and India. Furthermore, just as in the EU, energy security in 
Russia has both economic and political dimensions.79 For instance, NS1 has political 
value for Russia as it “increases Russia’s status in its relations with the EU and 
contributes to Russia’s position as a ‘strategic partner’ for the EU”80.  
However, the argument that Russian gas imports to Europe could improve the 
bilateral relationship is now questionable, as many Member States perceive 
increased energy imports from Russia problematic. National perspectives are 
without a doubt crucial for understanding the policy dilemmas the EU faces 
concerning energy, especially because of the role of Russia, as EU countries’ 
approaches to Russia vary considerably. Indeed, in 2007 the EU’s then Trade 
Commissioner Peter Mandelson stated that “no other country reveals our [the EU’s] 
differences as does Russia"81. Here it is important to highlight particularly the 
different perceptions of Germany and eastern Member States, most notably Poland 
but also the Baltic States. The Polish-Russian relationship is characterised by 
mistrust, and due to Poland’s size and central location within the EU, its perceptions 
“leave their mark on the overall EU-Russia relationship”82. And while multilateral 
relations are supported by Germany, it has frequently preferred bilateral talks with 
                                                             
78 Cichocki, Bartosz (2013), ”Poland”, ch. 6, pp.86-100 in David, Maxine, Gower, Jackie, & Haukkala, 
Hiski (eds.) (2013), National Perspectives on Russia: European Foreign Policy in the Making?, 
Routledge: London. 
79 Grib, M., 2010, interviewed by Sharples, 2013. 
80 Sharples, 2013, p.686. 
81 Mandelson, Peter (2007), ”The EU and Russia: our joint political challenge”, Speech in Conference 
”The Future relationship Between Russia and the European Union: Which kind of opportunities for the 
Italian Economy?”, Bologna, 20 Apr 2007. Available at: europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-07-
242_en.pdf. 
82 Cichocki, 2013, p.98. 
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Russia.83 This is also true of the Netherlands, for instance.84 From the angle of 
identity construction and historical perceptions of Russia, Siddi offers an 
illuminating account of the Polish and German stances towards NS1.85 His research 
highlights, for instance, that German discourse tended to focus on Russia as a 
reliable partner in energy trade, while Polish discourse presented energy trade as a 
geopolitical tool for Russia. It is clear that these same perceptions are repeated in 
the debate on NS2, as discussed in subsequent chapters.  
The Ukrainian crisis and subsequent incidents like the Skripal case in 2017 and Sea 
of Azov conflict in 2018 can be argued to have brought the EU countries closer 
together in their perception of Russia, or at least in their perception of appropriate 
actions towards Russia. This is apparent in, for example, the continued imposition 
of sanctions against Russia despite the fact there have been voices within the EU 
calling for the sanctions to be phased out.86 Energy, however, has been a somewhat 
special dimension. While the institutional energy relationship has suffered, the EU’s 
sanctions policy has largely left energy issues untouched and energy trade between 
Russia and the EU has continued uninterrupted.87 This is particularly true for the 
gas sector.88 Furthermore, there are no signs that the deteriorated relationship with 
Russia would have brought Member States closer together in energy issues on an 
                                                             
83 Stewart, Susan (2013), ”Germany”, ch. 2, pp.13-29 in David, Maxine, Gower, Jackie, & Haukkala, 
Hiski (eds.) (2013), National Perspectives on Russia: European Foreign Policy in the Making?, 
Routledge: London. 
84 Casier, Tom (2013a), ”Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands”, ch. 8, pp.118-131 in David, 
Maxine, Gower, Jackie, & Haukkala, Hiski (eds.) (2013), National Perspectives on Russia: European 
Foreign Policy in the Making?, Routledge: London; Although it should be highlighted that the 
downing of the Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 which killed 196 Dutch nationals has put a severe 
strain in Dutch-Russian relations since 2014. 
85 Siddi, Marco (2017a), National Identities and Foreign Policy in the European Union: The Russia 
Policy of Germany, Poland and Finland, ECPR Press: Colchester.  
86 E.g. Nienaber, Michael (2016), “Germany’s Steinmeier favors gradual phasing-out of Russia 
sanctions”, Reuters, 9 Jun 2016. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-
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87 Judge et al., 2016. 
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financing. For more on EU sanctions on Russia, see e.g. Meade, Robert & Zive, Joshua C. (2018), 
”International Sanctions and the Energy Sector – Part 2: Russia”, The National Law Review. 
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inter-governmental level, as is evidenced by the Council’s reluctance to pass new gas 
market legislation. 
Although it is justified to say that the Ukraine crisis has marked a clear watershed 
in the bilateral relationship between the EU and Russia, the EU-Russia relationship 
had been gradually worsening for a decade prior.89 The EU and Russia have held 
differing views of themselves, each other, as well as broader European and global 
order, with Russia advocating a multipolar Europe and the EU imaging an EU-centric 
Europe.90 Furthermore, Casier argues that “[t]he EU and Russia started to attribute 
each other negative geopolitical intentions up to the point where these images 
became so dominant that they interpreted each other’s’ behaviour almost 
exclusively in terms of these images, rather than on the basis of their actual 
behaviour”91. As shall be shown, this generally sceptical image of Russia is present 
in the NS2 debate.  
As shown in this chapter, both the context of European energy market and the EU-
Russian relationship have changed considerably since the inauguration of NS1. This 
at least partially explains why it is NS2 and not its predecessor that has stirred such 
a debate around itself. This chapter has further highlighted how the differing 
national perceptions of Russia, often stemming from historical relations with the 
eastern neighbour, are of key importance. The following chapters will each in turn 
discuss one of the dimensions of the debate – environmental, economic, and political 
arguments – and place the discourse into the EU’s internal market context as well as 
the context of the EU-Russian relationship.  
 
  
                                                             
89 Casier, Tom (2016) “From logic of competition to conflict: understanding the dynamics of EU-
Russia relations”, Contemporary Politics, 22:3, pp.376-394. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2016.1201311. 
90 Casier, Tom (2018), ”Russia and Europe. Back to where we began or a new order in the making?”, 
Keynote lecture at BASEES/Uppsala Conference 2018: Regimes and Societies in Conflict: Eastern 
Europe and Russia since 1956, Uppsala, 13 Sep 2018.  
91 Casier, 2016, p.376.  
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3. Environmental arguments  
 
This chapter shows that environmental arguments have not played a major role in 
the debate concerning NS2 within the EU. However, the environmental dimension 
is important to include as it is visible in many official documents, as the EU has 
increasingly tied climate policies into its energy strategy. Existing academic 
literature, too, recognises the environmental dimension as an important part of the 
EU’s energy policy.92 This thesis identifies two main types of environmental 
arguments which are analysed in this chapter: arguments related to the EU’s 
emissions targets and shift to a low-carbon economy, and arguments related to the 
EU’s environmental regulation. Furthermore, the analysis revealed some non-
specific environmental arguments, which shall be discussed at the end of the 
chapter. 
This thesis defines environmental arguments as arguments that refer to the 
environmental benefits and drawbacks of increased natural gas imports to the EU. 
This includes, for the most part, arguments related to greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions and the EU’s emission targets. This group of arguments also includes the 
so-called ‘bridge fuel’ argument which posits natural gas as an energy source 
facilitating the transition from a carbon-based economy to one running on 
renewable energy sources.  
It should be noted here that arguments related to the impact that the pipeline might 
have on marine life or fisheries are not included in the analysis due to the technical 
nature of this discussion. Furthermore, these issues were not prominent in the EU 
discussion, possibly because NS2 AG followed the Espoo Convention on the 
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context93 and completed a 
consultation process with all nine states that have a coastline on the Baltic Sea. NS2 
AG released the Environmental Impact Assessment report in April 2017, including 
                                                             
92 See e.g. Aalto & Westphal, 2007; Hafner & Tagliapietra, 2016.  
93 United Nations (1991/2017), Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context, New York. Available at: 
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explorations on topics such as marine geology and sediments, and hydrography and 
seawater quality.94 NS2 AG undertook this process despite the fact that Russia has 
not signed the Espoo convention.95 For the purposes of this thesis, this report shall 
be taken as an adequate sign of environmental responsibility, and the analysis of any 
possible shortcomings of this assessment, reporting and consultation process falls 
outside the scope of this thesis.  
 
3.1. Is Nord Stream 2 a ‘bridge to nowhere’?  
NS2 AG itself argues that NS2 is necessary for the EU to reach its emission reduction 
commitments. Indeed, this argument is included as one of the ‘rationales’ of the 
project: arguments such as “[n]atural gas offers a cost-effective and sustainable way 
to achieve emissions reduction targets” and “[t]he greenhouse gas footprint from 
Nord Stream 2 will be more than two times lower than that of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) exporters” are prominently presented on the company’s website.96 It should 
be noted that the sources that NS2 AG uses to support these claims are, for instance, 
Eurogas, an association representing the European gas industry, which calls gas 
“natural, decarbonised and renewable” and the “backbone of the energy transition 
and low-carbon economy of the future”97. Both of these claims are contested as 
discussed below. 
The context for the environmental arguments are the EU’s climate action 
commitments and its energy strategy, EESS. The EU has set a target of reducing its 
emissions by 20 percent from the 1990 level by 2020 (2020 target) and by 40 
percent by 2030 (2030 target). Currently, the EU is on track to meet its 2020 target 
and has prepared legislation to reach the 2030 target. The EU is also on track to meet 
its Kyoto 2nd commitment period (2013-2020) targets.98   
                                                             
94 NS2 AG (2017) “Espoo report – non-technical summary”. Available at: https://www.nord-
stream2.com/en/pdf/document/50/. 
95 NS2 AG (2019a), “International consultation process”. Available at: https://www.nord-
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96 NS2 AG, 2019b. 
97 Eurogas (2019), “Policy priorities”. Available at: https://eurogas.org/policy-priorities/.  
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EESS includes a package called “Clean energy for all Europeans”, which focuses on 
regulating and promoting energy efficiency, renewable energy, and better 
governance of the Energy Union and climate action. 99 Although the Energy Union 
has not yet been formed, new rules are set to be formally adopted in early 2019. 
These are meant to facilitate the progress towards creating the Energy Union. 
Furthermore, the EU is set to be a climate-neutral economy by 2050.100 Thus, 
transition to a more sustainable energy mix within the union is one of the official 
priorities for the EU’s climate policies. However, some observe a tension between 
decarbonisation and security of supply.101 Thus, it is unclear what new energy 
strategies actually mean for natural gas: while proponents see it as a viable option 
to facilitate the move towards a low-carbon economy, its opponents see natural gas 
as a polluting fossil fuel the usage of which should be reduced immediately instead 
of after a transition period.   
Natural gas is important for Germany, where nuclear power plants are set to close 
by 2022. This, together with emission reduction commitments, has prompted the 
country to look for alternative fuel options. Despite its higher emissions, coal has so 
far defended its position in the German energy mix due to its much cheaper price 
even when accounting for emission permit costs. However, because a government 
commission recently recommended the closure of coal-fired power plants, German 
natural gas demand is now expected to grow by 8 percent by 2022.102 It thus seems 
that the argument, advanced by the NS2 AG consortium, that Europe needs gas to 
meet its climate commitments, might conflate Europe with Germany. Although 
Germany is the EU’s largest natural gas market, and thus changes in the German 
market have strategic importance at the EU level, it is important to comprehend that 
the energy policy of the EU is not the same as the energy policy of Germany. 
                                                             
99 European Commission (2016a), “Clean energy for all Europeans”, COM(2016) 860 final, 30 Nov 
2016. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
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100 European Commission (2018a), “A clean planet for all – a European strategic long-term vision 
for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate neutral economy”, COM(2018) 773 final, 28 Nov 
2018. Available at: 
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101 Hafner & Tagliapietra, 2016. 
102 Eckert, Vera (2019), “German gas demand seen rising due to coal exit plan”, Reuters, 6 Feb 2019. 
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Interestingly, the documents analysed revealed no arguments in support of NS2 that 
refer to its environmental benefits.  The most positive approach is adopted by those 
in support of the so-called ‘bridge fuel’ or transition fuel argument, which perceives 
natural gas as a bridge between the current energy market and a low-carbon future 
market. The core of the argument is that as natural gas has lower CO2- emissions 
than coal and efficient technology and infrastructure for its utilisation already exists, 
it can be used to reduce European greenhouse gas emissions through the 
substitution of natural gas for coal. Coal is the most abundant European fossil fuel 
and in 2016 it represented 15.5 percent of primary energy consumption.103 
Contemporary, efficient natural gas power plants have been estimated to have up to 
60 percent lower CO2-emissions, representing a considerable reduction.104  
Nevertheless, this bridge fuel argument is also contested. For instance, only 
accounting for the emissions at the power plant but not at the place of extraction 
effectively externalises emissions that European energy consumption has. Methane 
leakages during transportation and processing represent a non-negligible risk 
regarding the emission predictions, as methane is a much stronger greenhouse gas 
than carbon dioxide.105 Indeed, due to these risks natural gas has been even called 
“a bridge to nowhere”106. Furthermore, it is unclear whether substantial 
investments into new natural gas infrastructure are economically sustainable if they 
are not in operation for long enough. This means that the time horizon of the move 
to a low-carbon economy, where the role of natural gas would be decreased 
substantially, is crucial for assessing whether the bridge fuel argument is a realistic 
one.107  
                                                             
103 European Environment Agency (2018), ”Primary energy consumption by fuel”. Available at: 
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104 Union of Concerned Scientists (n.d.), ”Environmental Impacts of Natural Gas”. Available at: 
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Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-012-0658-3; or Zhang, Xiaochun, Myhrvold, Nathan 
P., Hausfather, Zeke & Caldeira, Ken (2016), “Climate benefits of natural gas as a bridge fuel and 
 
41 
 
Despite of this, in general the EU supports the bridge fuel approach. For instance, 
the role of natural gas in the process of transitioning to a low-carbon economy is 
explicitly supported by ITRE, which in 2016 stated that it “[c]onsiders gas to be the 
transition fuel in the switch from an energy system based on fossil fuels to a system 
based on renewable energy, which must be the long-term goal in efforts to mitigate 
the effects of climate change”108. This is also the opinion of the Committee on 
International Trade (INTA) and the Committee on Environment, Public Health and 
Food Safety (ENVI).109 The 2016 report ITRE also states that natural gas must 
subsequently be phased out in favour of “clean energies”, an amendment suggested 
by a group of ALDE MEPs from Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and the 
Czech Republic, although no time horizon is presented.110 More recently, the 
European Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy, Miguel Arias Cañete stated 
that natural gas will function as a bridge to allow the EU to decarbonise and meet its 
net-zero emissions target of 2050.111 
It is important to note that those advocating the use of natural gas as a bridge fuel 
and defending its place in the European energy mix do not automatically support 
NS2. For example, in the same ITRE report mentioned above, AFET also raises 
concern about the fact that the EU’s gas imports from Russia have increased. 
Furthermore, while ENVI states that natural gas can play a transitional role in the 
process of transitioning to renewable energy sources, it otherwise takes a stance 
that seems sceptical of further investment in gas import infrastructure to the EU.112 
Furthermore, the ITRE report and the opinions by other Parliament Committees all 
highlight the role of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in particular, as opposed to 
traditional pipeline gas imports, as LNG also allows for greater diversification of 
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109 ITRE, 2016 Sep 29. 
110 Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) (2016 Jun 16), “Amendments 1-265 – EU 
strategy for liquefied natural gas and gas storage”, PE 584.007v02-00. Available at: 
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2050/news/canete-sees-gas-as-a-bridge-to-reach-eus-clean-energy-goals/. 
112 ITRE, 2016 Sep 29.  
42 
 
supply sources. Nevertheless, this perception that the EU will need natural gas to 
meet its set targets forms part of the arguments supporting building additional 
natural gas import capacity, and could also lend support to the NS2 project. This is 
why it is surprising that the analysis revealed no environmental arguments 
explicitly supporting NS2. 
 
3.2. Gazprom’s compliance with environmental regulation 
It is clear that in the debate on the environmental impact of the NS2, its opponents 
have dominated the discussion. This stems from two factors. First, in general it is 
probably more common to present parliamentary questions which criticise current 
developments as a way of trying to induce change. Second, as the official EU line 
supports the usage of natural gas in the transition to a low-carbon economy, the 
proponents of the project possibly perceive the institutional framework to be on 
their side and have thus not engaged in the debate as much as the opponents.  
Many of the documents that express wariness towards NS2 approach environmental 
questions from a regulatory angle and state that the new pipeline will have to 
respect the EU’s environmental rules and goals.113 Indeed, the official EU line 
towards NS2 is mainly based on this ‘regulatory’ argument. Rather than pointing to 
any tangible shortcomings of the project, or giving any detailed justifications why 
Gazprom might not respect the applicable rules, this argument reflects the 
deteriorated relationship between the EU and Russia and the general lack of trust 
the EU has towards Russia. The events in recent years have severely undermined 
the EU’s faith in Russia as an actor that respects international law and agreements. 
These concerns were raised before any steps towards building NS2 were made. 
Russia has remained outside the Energy Charter Treaty framework, and already in 
2012 the Council expressed suspicion towards Russia’s “willingness to share in 
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practice with the EU common principles such as achieving…environmentally 
sustainable markets”114. The Energy Charter Treaty is an international, multilateral 
agreement with fifty-three signatories and contracting parties, including the EU and 
Euratom. Its aim is to work towards “more open and competitive energy 
markets”115. It can thus be argued that at least partly this regulatory approach to 
environmental issues is more reflective of the general lack of trust in Russia than 
any tangible environmental issues identified in the NS2 project.  
Apart from the regulatory angle, the analysed documents also revealed other 
arguments against NS2 based on environmental concerns. Some actors within the 
Union’s institutions perceive NS2 as a counterproductive investment when it comes 
to common environmental goals. For instance, in an amendment document relating 
to a motion for a Parliament resolution, Dario Tamburrano and Rosa D’Amato (Italy, 
EFDD) suggest that the Parliament should express “deep concern about any further 
expenditure in fossil infrastructures in any point of the Energy Union, including the 
proposed doubling of capacity of the Nord Stream pipeline”116. Similar kind of view 
is reflected in a question that Jeppe Kofod (Denmark, S&D) presented to the 
Commission in the Parliament, in which he argued that NS2 “will effectively keep 
Europe dependent…on fossil fuels”117. 
A 2016 opinion by ENVI, while not explicitly taking a stance for or against the NS2 
project, points out that EU gas demand has been consistently overestimated in the 
past, and any infrastructure investments should reflect the assumption of decreased 
demand.118 However, 2016-2017 saw 7 consecutive quarters of increased natural 
gas demand in the EU; only Q4 of 2017 saw a 2 percent decrease measured year-on-
year.119 Q2 and Q3 of 2018, the latest reports available, have reported a decrease in 
                                                             
114 Council of European Union (2012 May 11), “Relations with Russia: Key outstanding issues for 
the EU in its relations with Russia”, ST 9822 2012 INIT, Brussels. Available at: 
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115 International Energy Charter (2019), “The Energy Charter Treaty”. Available at: 
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116 ITRE, 2016 Jun 16, p.85. 
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the EU’s gas demand (8 percent and 5 percent respectively).120 In general, reports 
on EU gas markets highlight the unpredictability and weather-dependency of gas 
consumption; lower than average temperatures increase the demand while higher 
than average temperatures lower the demand. The share of natural gas in primary 
energy demand is expected to stay stable or decline slightly by 2050.121 However, 
the EU’s domestic production is expected to decline, as shown in graph 4, especially 
due to the closure of the Groningen fields in the Netherlands. Thus, it is not clear 
whether more investment into import infrastructure is actually counterproductive 
regarding the long-term energy mix of the EU and its emission targets.  
Graph 4: Indigenous conventional production, bcm/a, 2018-2040 
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121 European Commission (2016b) “EU Reference Scenario 2016 – Energy, transport and GHG 
emissions, trends to 2050”. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/ref2016_report_final-web.pdf; European 
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Some of the environmental arguments against the NS2 are rather vague, like the one 
presented by Anna Elżbieta Fotyga (Poland, ECR), one of the most consistent and 
active opponents of NS2. She asks the Commission how it sees the fact that the 
project presents “substantial environmental risks and challenges” without, 
however, clarifying what these might actually be.122 In general, those documents 
that contain environmental arguments against NS2 tend to also discuss the project 
from a political or economic angle, only using the environmental argument as a 
further justification for their stance against it. For example, in the question 
presented to the Commission by Michał Marusik (Poland, ENF), who raises the issue 
of reports of increased pollution in the construction sites of NS2, environmental 
issues seem like a secondary consideration as this point is presented after 
discussing the joint Polish and Ukrainian statement that labels NS2 as a threat to EU 
countries.123 In addition to the low number of environmental arguments discovered 
in the analysed documents, this tendency supports the conclusion that 
environmental and emissions-related arguments have not played a large role in the 
intra-EU debate on NS2. 
Because of the EU’s emphasis on climate change action, it is surprising that the 
environmental considerations of increased natural gas imports have not been much 
debated or discussed within the EU, at least with regards to NS2. Environmental 
arguments appear only in a few documents, and even in the parliamentary questions 
– which otherwise offer a wide range of arguments, as shown in the next chapters – 
only three analysed questions referred to the environmental dimension. 
Furthermore, those documents that do discuss the environmental dimension tend 
to use it as an additional argument supporting more politically or economically 
oriented arguments. Although parliamentary questions raised doubts on the 
environmental impact, most analysed EU documents adopt the view that increased 
natural gas imports – and thus potentially NS2, too – are beneficial for the EU’s 
environmental targets. In most cases, this argument is based on the bridge fuel 
                                                             
122 Fotyga, Anna Elżbieta (2018 Jul 11), “Ten threats posed by the possible construction of the Nord 
Stream 2 gas pipeline”, P-003817/2018. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-
2018-003817_EN.pdf. 
123 Marusik, Michał (2018 Jul 17), “Commission’s stance on the construction of the Nord Stream 2 
pipeline“, E-003988/2018. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-
003988_EN.pdf. 
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argument, either explicitly or implicitly. It is thus concluded that the consensus 
within the union is that from an environmental standpoint, the NS2 project makes 
sense to the EU.  
The lack of arguments regarding the environmental impact contrasts sharply with 
the abundance of political arguments relating to the construction of NS2, the topic 
of chapter 5. But first, the analysis turns to the economic dimension.  
47 
 
4. Economic arguments 
  
This chapter discusses arguments that primarily relate to economic considerations, 
for instance, prices or economic growth. Arguments relating to competition and 
monopolies are also included in this group. The chapter argues that somewhat 
surprisingly, the debate on NS2 has focused relatively little on the economic 
consequences of the pipeline. This dimension, just as the environmental dimension 
presented in chapter 3, is also dominated by those opposing the pipeline. 
 
4.1. Does NS2 make economic sense? 
According to the European Commission, energy security underpins the “future 
economic prosperity” of the EU.124 It is thus clear that sufficient and reliable energy 
flows have an economic dimension. NS2 AG, in other words Gazprom, operates on 
the basis that NS2 is beneficial to Europe from an economic standpoint, and NS2 AG 
presents multiple economic justifications for the project. It expects NS2 to reduce 
gas prices in Germany and, through interconnectors and reverse flows, in its 
neighbouring countries and wider Europe.  
Because NS2 is the shortest route between the origins of the gas and its destination 
and follows the already established route of NS1, the company presents it as a 
cheaper transmission route than onshore pipelines or LNG. Russian gas is stated to 
be “among the most cost-effective sources” of natural gas to Europe.125 NS2 AG also 
maintains that it will improve competition within Europe: “[b]y making more 
affordable Russian gas available, the pipeline will not only create an appealing 
alternative to LNG imports, but also reduce overall import prices. This equals big 
savings on Europe's gas import bill, especially in a tight global gas market when LNG 
demand is high in other regions.”126 Indeed, a representative of NS2 AG has even 
                                                             
124 European Commission, 2015 Nov 19.  
125 NG2 AG (2018), “Questions and answers: Nord Stream 2 – a new natural gas pipeline through 
the Baltic Sea”. Available at: https://www.nord-stream2.com/en/pdf/document/38/. 
126 NS2 AG (2019d), “Why Europe needs Nord Stream 2”. Available at: https://www.nord-
stream2.com/project/rationale/. 
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written a paper addressing some of the opposing claims, mainly building on the 
argument that increased gas through NS2 will increase competition and thus benefit 
consumers.127 
It is interesting that none of the 81 documents analysed that explicitly mention NS2 
present economic arguments in favour of the pipeline project. This could be a result 
of the document selection bias discussed in the methodology section: it is possible 
that the proponents of the pipeline have argued in favour of increased imports on a 
more general level, leaving the highly contentious NS2 project unmentioned, and 
thus the document has not been found under the search terms presented earlier. It 
is also possible – and perhaps even more plausible – that this is because the debate 
within the EU has focused on the political and regulatory aspects of the project; as 
will be discussed in the next chapter, the political arguments have dominated the 
debate. It is nevertheless interesting that none of the proponents of the project have 
attempted to frame the discussion in explicitly economic terms, through cheaper gas 
prices, for instance. One reason for this could be the predatory pricing strategies 
used by Gazprom in Eastern European countries. Indeed, Gazprom’s previous 
pricing policies are one of the key economic arguments used against NS2, as is 
discussed below. 
The analysis revealed multiple economic arguments used against the project. At the 
most extreme end are arguments which question the economic basis or the business 
rationale of the project. For instance, in a parliamentary question Nikolay Barekov 
(Bulgaria) and Zdzisław Krasnodębski (Poland) on behalf of the ECR Group argue 
that “[t]he economic rationale behind the project is also dubious given that the 
utilisation rate of the existing Nord Stream pipeline’s capacity is currently around 
50%”128. Those questioning the economic rationale see NS2 instead as a political 
tool of the Russian government as the Russian state is Gazprom’s largest owner. The 
next chapter looks at these political arguments in more detail, but it is important to 
                                                             
127 Barnes, Alex (2017), ”Nord Stream 2 – friend or enemy of energy security in Europe?”, IDEAS 
Working Paper Series from RePEc, St. Louis. Available at: 
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128 Barekov, Nikolay & Krasnodębski, Zdzisław (2016 Jan 21), “Impact of Nord Stream 2 on the gas 
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note here that they relate very closely to the economic arguments, and indeed often 
overlap. The profitability of NS2 depends on multiple variables, including LNG prices 
as well as Ukraine’s transit fees.129 It should be noted that Russia has already 
considerably reduced gas transit through Ukraine, and that the transit contract 
between Gazprom and Naftogaz is expiring 31 December 2019.130 As recounted in 
chapter 2, Gazprom’s European strategy has focused on ensuring flexibility of 
exports, but this strategy has also considerable risks due to high infrastructure costs.  
 
4.2. Market efficiency as an EU priority 
The most common arguments presented against NS2, however, are not related to 
the motivations of the pipeline project. Instead, they focus on efficient market 
structure: market power and competition, Gazprom’s role as a dominant supplier, 
and regulation. Implicitly these arguments contrast the liberal market identity of the 
EU with the assumption that Gazprom will not ‘play by the rules’. These arguments 
highlight that allowing Gazprom increased access to European markets further 
increases its market power and bolsters its position as a dominant supplier, and thus 
reduces competition, goes against the liberal values of the EU’s energy market 
structure, and possibly undermines EU regulation. As mentioned earlier, concerns 
relating to the abuse of market power are not unfounded: only in May 2018, the EU 
and Gazprom closed a seven-year court case related to Gazprom charging higher 
prices in Eastern Europe. “The EU’s longest running antitrust saga” ended in no fines 
– which could have amounted up to 10 percent of its global turnover under EU 
legislation – imposed on Gazprom as the competition authority stated that 
“Gazprom’s concessions allay concerns of market abuse”.131 The two parties 
finalised the deal a year earlier but the closing of the case was delayed by heavy 
criticism from several eastern Member States.  
                                                             
129 Schulte, Simon (2016), ”Nord Stream 2: Gazprom’s answer to a strategic disadvantage?”, 
Institute of Energy Economics, University of Cologne. Available at: https://www.ewi.uni-
koeln.de/en/nord-stream-2-gazproms-answer-to-a-strategic-disadvantage/. 
130 Pirani, Simon & Yafimava, Katja (2016), ”Russian gas transit across Ukraine post-2019”, OIES 
paper: NG 105, Oxford. Available at: https://doi.org/10.26889/9781784670542. 
131 Chee, Yun Foo & de Carbonnel, Alissa (2018), “EU ends antitrust case against Gazprom without 
fines”, Reuters, 24 May 2018. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-gazprom-
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Indeed, the criticism towards this decision is apparent in the arguments against NS2, 
too. For instance, in a 2018 Parliamentary question, a group of seven MEPs from 
Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Luxembourg asked “[w]hy did the Commission 
decide to separate Gazprom antitrust proceedings from the Nord Stream 2 issue, 
despite knowing that the construction of Nord Stream 2 will bolster the dominant 
position of Gazprom on the EU gas market?”132. This group is also an excellent 
example of how the issue of NS2 is divided by state borders more than 
Parliamentary groups or ideologies,133 as the MEPs represent five different groups: 
NI (Jacek Saryusz-Wolski), PPE (Laima Liucija Andrikienė, Algirdas Saudargas), 
ALDE (Petras Auštrevičius), ECR (Zdzisław Krasnodębski) and VERTS/ALE (Indrek 
Tarand, Claude Turmes).  
Furthermore, MEPs Fotyga and Charles Tannock (UK; on behalf of the ECR group) 
refer to the unfair pricing practice in 2016 already, although they did not name NS2 
or Gazprom explicitly. They suggested an amendment to an AFET opinion, in which 
they state that  
“…the Commission should attempt, within its competence and with 
respect to the rules of subsidiarity and proportionality, to ensure that 
dominant gas suppliers in a region do not abuse their position in breach 
of EU antitrust rules, with particular reference to unfair prices charged 
in Member States as well as to the use of interruptions in supplies for 
economic and political blackmail.”134 
This suggested amendment did not, however, make its way to the final Decision of 
the European Parliament and of the Council. 
The concerns about the impact NS2 would have on competition date to the 
beginning of the debate. In 2015, Inese Vaidere (Latvia, EPP) stated that NS2 
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“increases EU dependence on Russia’s gas monopoly, reduces competition”135. 
Reduced competition was also used as an argument by Urmas Paet (Estonia, ALDE) 
who referred to the decision by the Polish Office of Competition and Consumer 
Protection, which “has decided to exclude partners from purchasing stakes in other 
Nord Stream Pipelines”136. Polish authorities have since opened an official 
investigation into whether Gazprom and the European investors of NS2 have 
breached anti-monopoly laws.137 This is a prime example of how the mistrust 
between Poland and Russia is reflected on NS2.  
In the economic dimension, questions and comments on EU regulation relate 
precisely to the fact that NS2 – that is, Gazprom – must comply with competition 
rules.138 Questions of Russia and Russian companies’ compliance with EU regulation 
have been a concern throughout the period analysed, as the first mention is found 
in a 2012 document by the Council.139 Compliance with competition rules is also 
present in some of the first Commission documents which explicitly mention NS2.140 
This is similar to some of the environmental arguments against NS2 that expressed 
scepticism of Gazprom complying with the EU’s environmental regulation. The 
arguments related to EU regulation will be more closely presented in the next 
chapter. 
The dominant supplier argument is used by, for example, Tomasz Piotr Poręba 
(Poland, ECR), who in a 2016 Parliamentary question stated that NS2 is against the 
goal of diversification as it strengthens the position of a dominant supplier.141 In a 
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later question MEP Poręba also raised concern with the Commission draft decision 
allowing Gazprom to increase its usage of the OPAL pipeline, the onshore extension 
of NS, from 50 percent to 80 percent, quoting the same issues of strengthened 
monopoly position on the German market, as well as the bypassing of Yamal 
(Poland) and Brotherhood (Ukraine) pipelines.142 This is similar to the position 
adopted by ITRE, which in a 2016 report underlined that “a doubling of the capacity 
of the Nord Stream pipeline would give one company a dominant position on the 
European gas market, which should be avoided”143. The dominant supplier 
argument is the economic counterpart to the diversification argument, covered by 
the final chapter in the context of EU strategy and other political arguments. 
In addition to arguments related to efficient markets, the analysis revealed multiple 
documents that discussed the impact NS2 would have on LNG infrastructure. This 
angle was prominent in debates relating to the EU’s strategy for liquefied natural 
gas, formulated by ITRE. This report states that if NS2 were built, “contrary to 
European interests”, an assessment on the accessibility of LNG terminals would be 
required.144 In an amendment suggestion to AFET’s opinion on this report, Petras 
Auštrevičius (Lithuania, ALDE) argues that NS2 would “affect negatively the 
economic sustainability and efficiency of existing and future LNG terminals”145. 
AFET accepted and included this amendment in the same form to its final opinion.146 
There is some support in existing research for this argument; for instance, Loskot-
Strachota argues that NS2 might limit LNG demand, discourage further investment 
and as a result hinder the diversification of supply sources.147 
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The economic arguments highlight an interesting trend in the documents, namely 
that only a few of them provide any evidence for the stated opinion. As discussed in 
the methodology section, this is especially true for parliamentary questions and 
amendment suggestions. Although this is apparent in many documents, one of the 
best examples is the parliamentary question presented by Monika Flašíková-Beňová 
(Slovakia, S&D), who states that “Russian gas transported through Nord Stream 2 
could be many times more expensive to the end user than gas transported through 
the Ukrainian pipeline” without any reference to possible reasons why this could 
be.148 This line of argument, with no justifications provided, leads to a rather 
fruitless line of discussion: the Commission’s response simply stated that increased 
interconnectivity and diversification of the European gas market will lead to more 
competitive prices with no reference to NS2 itself.149 It is, however, noteworthy that 
the Commission later changed its stance on this and has subsequently adopted the 
view that NS2 will cause price increases to some countries and is thus 
unacceptable.150  
As is obvious from the discussion of the economic arguments against the pipeline 
project, the opponents of NS2 have mostly framed the debate in relation to 
Gazprom’s market position and historical issues rather than the direct economic 
impact that increased Russian natural gas imports to Europe might have. Although 
raised in a 2017 ITRE plenary sitting by the Commission representative Klaus-
Dieter Borchardt,151 the possible price increases to some member states as well as 
European countries outside the union have not been a prominent topic of 
discussion. Rather, problems regarding NS2 have been framed to fit the narrative of 
a liberal market economy with efficient, fair markets.  
Many of these arguments of course have a strong political dimension and are not 
purely economic. Thus, the next chapter turns to the political arguments presented 
in the debate on NS2. The concluding chapter will pull together the analysis of all 
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three dimensions and explore the interconnectedness of the environmental, 
economic and political arguments.  
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5. Political arguments 
 
Whether or not NS2 is a political project or purely business has been one of the most 
visible topics in public discussion. This chapter looks at how the NS2 is framed in 
the political dimension and analyses arguments related to the commerce-politics 
axis as well as broader policies and policy-making of the EU. The main argument 
advanced is that the political dimension has dominated the debate – indeed, almost 
each one of the analysed 81 documents explicitly mentioning NS2 included an 
argument that could be placed into the political dimension. This chapter also offers 
further support to the argument that the division within the EU on NS2 is smaller 
than would commonly appear, with a large majority of the arguments opposing the 
pipeline. 
This thesis distinguishes between two types of political arguments presented in the 
debate: internally and externally oriented ones. The “internal” political arguments 
are those that relate to factors such as EU’s core values; EU regulation, legislation 
and strategy; and the goals expressed in strategy and policy documents. The 
“external” dimension of political arguments represents arguments that focus on 
actors and issues outside the EU. External arguments relate to, for instance, Ukraine, 
the wider eastern neighbourhood, and Russia from a foreign policy perspective. As 
with the other argument classifications, these groups are non-exclusive and there is 
considerable overlap between them. This chapter shows that most arguments 
presented in the political dimension are internally oriented and relate to the aims of 
EU policies: solidarity, diversification, and energy security.  
It is important to note that both proponents and opponents of NS2 tend to list 
multiple different arguments relating to the political sphere. In other words, many 
actors consider the different political arguments to be complements. Furthermore, 
as mentioned in the previous chapter, political arguments are closely intertwined 
with the economic arguments. Indeed, their separation is often difficult and not 
always purposeful.   
This chapter is divided into three subsections. The first and second part discuss the 
internal and external arguments, respectively, while the third section explores the 
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connections between these two dimensions and takes note of some of the most 
important and interesting results of the discussion.  
 
5.1. Solidarity and diversification in EU strategy (internally oriented arguments) 
As presented in chapter 2, the EU highlights security, solidarity and trust as one of 
the five dimensions on which the Energy Union will be built on. Secure gas supplies 
and the diversification of gas supply sources as well as routes are presented as goals 
of the union.152 Furthermore, the Commission highlights that “[s]olidarity and 
regional cooperation, as well as speaking with one voice internationally when 
dealing with supplier countries, are key to this [resilient energy system]”153, as the 
EESS presented in chapter 2 also emphasises. Security of Gas Supply Regulation was 
adopted in 2017 in order to increase the protection the EU had against gas supply 
disruptions. The Regulation further emphasised regional cooperation and the 
pooling of resources. Diversification of gas supplies is explicitly stated to mean the 
promotion of increased access to the global LNG market and promotion of the 
Southern Gas Corridor154, which would diversify “supplies by bringing in gas from 
the Caspian countries, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea”155.  
In line with the analysis of the previous two dimensions, only a few of the analysed 
documents expressed positive views about the NS2. However, it is noteworthy that 
the majority of arguments in favour of NS2 are in the political group, as this suggests 
that the proponents found it most beneficial to frame NS2 in the political dimension 
or, perhaps that responding to the criticism presented in the political framework 
has been perceived as the most crucial one to address. This is highly interesting, as 
the general perception is that those who support the project mainly lean on 
                                                             
152 European Commission, n.d. a. 
153 European Commission, n.d. a. 
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https://bankwatch.org/project/southern-gas-corridor-euro-caspian-mega-pipeline. 
155 European Commission, n.d. a. 
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economic and emissions-related arguments. The reason for this counterintuitive 
result is at least partly the logic of classification used in this thesis: even those 
arguments which, for instance, are against the “politicisation” of the pipeline are 
classified as political, as this is the dimension to which they most closely relate. 
Indeed, the political arguments presented in favour of NS2 can be divided into two 
groups: those that discuss the politicisation or ideologisation of NS2 or trade with 
Russia in general, and those that refer to TEP and other EU regulation. 
Before continuing to the analysis of the specific arguments, it is worth noting that all 
of the internally oriented arguments in favour of NS2 were made by German or 
French representatives. This is not surprising since the fact that most active 
proponents of NS2 are from the investor countries is well noted in previous 
literature. As discussed in chapter 3, it is indeed unclear whether it is the EU or 
Germany who needs the new pipeline: due to the closures of nuclear plants and 
emission reduction commitments pushing out coal, Germany is expecting a surge in 
natural gas demand. Thus, it is not surprising it is German MEPs that lend their 
support to the project. This supports the common perception, as outlined by 
Stewart, that Germany has tended to “focus on national interests in the economic 
and energy fields, whereas in other areas the broader EU context is more likely to 
be taken into account”156.  However, it is worthy to note that there is also opposition 
from German MEPs, as will be discussed in the third part of this chapter. Finally, it 
is noteworthy that no arguments were found by Dutch or Austrian representatives, 
although both countries have supported Germany in the Council. Thus, the fact that 
NS2 is a more “European” project than NS1 is not strongly reflected in the debate.157   
It is clear that support for NS2 and opposition to EU’s regulatory power concerning 
the project has become almost synonymous with Germany. By the end of 2018 – 
which is the end of the time period under analysis in this thesis – the German 
government had not withdrawn its support from the project despite both internal 
(from German politicians) and external (from other Member States and the US) 
                                                             
156 Stewart, 2013, p.13. 
157 Gazprom and German investor companies financed 82% of NS1, while for NS2 this figure is 70%. 
Nord Stream (2019), “Our shareholders”. Available at: https://www.nord-stream.com/about-
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pressures.158 NS2 clearly highlights the complex dynamics between Member States 
and EU institutions – although all three major EU bodies had by the end of 2018 
expressed concerns about the project, it still had the support of the largest countries, 
France and Germany, as well as a handful of other Member States.  Thus, no majority 
in the Council has been reached to pass new legislation which both the Parliament 
and the Commission have supported.159  
The first group of internal political arguments, as already stated above, contains 
those statements that refer to the politicisation of the issue or its ideological 
underpinnings. Markus Ferber (Germany, EPP), for instance, argues in a question 
presented to the Commission that the Commission’s job is to promote legal 
certainty. His question implies that introducing new regulation due to NS2 would be 
counter to the Commission’s tasks and that political opinions should not have room 
in that process.160 Political opinions can quite clearly here be seen to relate to the 
role of Russia in the European energy environment. Along similar lines, while 
advocating support for regions with a low level of diversification of energy sources, 
Jean-Luc Schaffhauser (France, ENF) highlights in an amendment suggestion that 
“energy policy should be implemented in a pragmatic, non-ideologically motivated 
manner in respect of long-established suppliers such as Russia”161. 
Perhaps the strongest stance is taken by Knut Fleckenstein (Germany, S&D), who in 
a question to the Commission calls for action to prevent the further escalation of the 
politicisation of trade with Russia.162 He argues that the requested mandate from 
the Council to negotiate “special rules for Nord Stream 2” is just this. MEP 
Fleckenstein also questions why the Commission facilitates the politicization of NS2 
by allowing US interference through sanctions imposed on European firms. The 
                                                             
158 “Germany to back Nord Stream 2 despite Ukraine tensions”, Euractiv, 4 Dec 2018. Available at: 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/germany-to-back-nord-stream-2-despite-
ukraine-tensions/. 
159 Meier et al., 2019. 
160 Ferber, Markus (2017 Oct 22), “Ensuring that the rule of law governs approval procedures in the 
case of the Nord Stream 2 project”, E-001940/2017. 
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161 AFET, 2016 Jun 2, p.21.  
162 Fleckenstein, Knut (2017 Jun 19), “Politicisation of major European energy projects such as 
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Commission’s response reiterated the stance that NS2 cannot operate in a legal void 
or under third country regulation.163 
MEP Fleckenstein’s argument also relates to the second group of internally oriented 
political arguments supporting NS2: those that refer to EU regulation and, more 
specifically, the Third Energy Package (TEP). Here a few actors have pointed to the 
mandate the Commission requested from the Council to negotiate on the project 
directly with Russia on behalf of all the Member States. This mandate was requested 
on the premise that since TEP was found to not apply to NS2 in 2016 by the 
Commission’s legal service, NS2 would operate in a legislative void.164 In a question 
to the Commission, presented in mid-2017, Jens Gieseke (Germany, EPP) however 
argued, referring to a decision by the German Federal Network Agency, that any 
additional legislation regarding the project would be discriminatory.165 Hermann 
Winkler and Joachim Zeller (Germany, EPP) also argue it is “crystal clear” there is 
no legislative void and ask how the Council will ensure the mandate does not 
amount to discrimination against NS2166. This stance was repeated a few months 
later in a question to the Commission in which they asked “[h]ow will the 
Commission ensure that the proposed legislation does not unlawfully discriminate 
against Nord Stream 2?”167 Defending its own position, the Commission in its 
response noted that the legislation does not distinguish between individual 
countries or pipelines and cannot thus be argued to amount to discrimination.168 
Furthermore, an amendment suggestion to an ITRE report by MEPs Schaffhauser 
and Nicolas Bay (France, ENF) highlights how the issue of NS2 focuses on certain 
Member States specifically. This is apparent in the arguments against NS2, where 
                                                             
163 Cañete, Arias (2017 Sep 4 b), “Answer on behalf of the Commission”, E-004024/2017(ASW). 
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164 Gieseke, Jens (2017 Jun 14), “Possible negotiations with Russia on Nord Stream 2”, E-
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165 Gieseke, 2017 Jun 14. 
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especially the role of Germany repeatedly comes up. However, it is interesting that 
Germany’s role also comes up in a document supporting NS2. This suggested 
amendment states that  
“[The Commission]…highlights that the project is directly in line with the 
underlying principles of the Energy Union, as it is the result of the desire 
of private monopoly stakeholders and, therefore, is the result of EU 
legislation, of Germany's desire to achieve hegemony and monopolise 
this liberalised internal market, and of Poland's policy of non-
cooperation towards the Russian gas stakeholders in the Yamal-Europe 
2 gas pipeline construction project;”169 
As ENF is a Eurosceptic group this stance is not as surprising, and one can with 
reasonable confidence say that MEPs Schaffhauser and Bay did not expect this 
amendment to go through to the final ITRE report.170 Instead, this comment 
underlines the usefulness of amendment documents – in all of their complexity – as 
sources for analysing divisions within the EU, as MEPs use them as an opportunity 
to convey their opinions. What this quote highlights is the perception that Member 
States tend to drive their own agendas. It is also a clear criticism of Germany’s 
dominant role in the union. 
Essentially, MEPs Schaffhauser and Bay imply there is a lack of solidarity within the 
EU. This is one of the most common internally oriented political arguments 
presented against NS2, alongside diversification and appeals to EU regulation. These 
three main arguments against NS2 shall be discussed next. Furthermore, the 
strategic goal of security of supply is discussed in relation to each of these three 
arguments, but especially diversification and regulation, as these are the tools with 
which supply security is argued to be achieved.  
 
Solidarity  
Appeals to solidarity are visible in many types of documents, from ITRE reports to 
parliamentary questions. The core of the argument is that NS2 undermines 
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solidarity by prioritising economic relations between Germany and Russia, not 
energy security of other Member States or indeed the Union as a whole.171 In May 
2016, an ITRE draft report on a Motion for a European Parliament Resolution 
expressed concern about NS2 due to the effects it would have “on energy security 
and diversification of supply sources and the principle of solidarity among Member 
States”172. As is clear, this statement also outlines other common internally directed 
political arguments against NS2, diversification and energy security, and is thus an 
excellent example of their interconnectedness. AFET’s opinion on the same topic 
includes similar arguments, for instance by noting that NS2 “will go against the 
principle of solidarity and trust among Member States, [and] undermine efforts up-
to-date of diversification of supply sources”173.  
Appealing to solidarity is an interesting argument because solidarity is one of the 
core principles of the EU – indeed, one can find it mentioned in most official EU 
policy documents, like the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
mentioned in chapter 2. For instance, the 2015 Energy Union Package by the Council 
sees the Energy Union “based on true solidarity and trust”174. This is further echoed 
in the First State of the Energy Union report some half a year later which even has a 
subheading “Energy security, solidarity and trust” to discuss the interconnectedness 
of the three, within the EU but also in the broader neighbourhood.175 However, 
David et al. argue solidarity within the EU is difficult to achieve because of the 
different experiences with Russia.176 Thus even though solidarity is a key value of 
the EU, the term is open for interpretation, which is likely to cause tensions between 
Member States with different perceptions of Russia. Nevertheless, the popularity of 
solidarity is at least partially due to the fact that it is one of the core principles of the 
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172 Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) (2016 May 10), “Draft Report on EU 
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EU, as this makes it an argument that is easy to justify with existing adopted policy. 
For instance, MEP Fotyga suggested that the EU should be able to block projects 
“that go against the European solidarity and are not compatible with III Energy 
Package [TEP] or which increase EU Member States’ or the Eastern Partners’ 
dependency”, specifically naming NS2.177  
Solidarity makes an interesting argument also because there is a clear difference in 
how it is used in different documents. Many official documents and amendment 
suggestions do not explicitly explain what is meant by solidarity. It is not specified, 
for instance, how NS2 undermines solidarity, or who needs to show solidarity to 
whom. On the contrary, many of the parliamentary questions discuss solidarity in a 
more concrete manner, again highlighting the usefulness of this type of resource for 
the analysis. For instance, in a 2015 question directed to the Council, a group of ECR 
MEPs stated that NS2 undermines solidarity in energy policy and requested the 
union shows solidarity towards Member States of Central and Eastern Europe 
“whose investments are under threat”178. In a question to the Commission, András 
Gyürk (Hungary, EPP) asked how the Commission will compensate those central 
and eastern Members who will see price increases due to NS2179 – although no 
justification for the assumption of price increases is given. These arguments also 
highlight the connection between solidarity and the economic dimension, which 
shall be returned to at the end of this chapter.  
Moreover, parliamentary questions appealing to solidarity are interesting due to 
their variety. Although reminders of solidarity as a core principle of the EU and calls 
for more solidarity between what might be called the old and the new members of 
the Union are the most common arguments, they are not the only ones. For instance, 
MEP Fotyga, in a question to the Commission, states that there is an “influential 
group of officials putting the interests of German and Austrian energy companies 
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and Gazprom above common interests and solidarity”180, thus referring more to 
individual actors than states themselves. 
 
Diversification 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, political and economic arguments 
are closely interconnected. This is especially true for the diversification argument 
which relates to the EU’s energy strategy and is the political side of the “dominant 
supplier” argument presented in the previous chapter. The reasoning behind 
separating these two arguments into different groups relates to their 
contextualisation: while the dominant supplier argument was mostly framed within 
the “liberal, efficient market” context, the diversification argument, as it is discussed 
here, is framed within the EU’s strategy and regulation, thus making it a more 
politically oriented argument. 
Diversification is an argument that appears even more often than appeals to 
solidarity in the debate on NS2. Diversification is similar to solidarity in that it is a 
core principle of EESS: one of the eight pillars on which the strategy is built on is 
“diversifying external supplies and related infrastructure”181. As is clear from the 
citations presented earlr, it is often bundled together with solidarity and especially 
energy security, which diversification is perceived to guarantee or at least help to 
achieve. Diversification should thus actually be understood as a tool, not a goal in 
itself. Nevertheless, because it is presented as an aim of the EESS, it makes a natural 
and easy justification for arguments against NS2.  
Diversification, however, is also very different from solidarity as an argument 
because it is more tangible and less value based. NS2 has been estimated to increase 
Germany’s reliance on Russian gas to 80 percent of its total natural gas 
consumption.182 This makes it easy for those opposing the pipeline to argue in a 
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concrete manner that NS2 goes directly against the adopted energy strategy. Thus, 
those arguing that NS2 goes against the goal of diversification also point to how the 
project conflicts with EU strategy and regulation more generally by running 
“contrary to the underlying principles of a fully integrated, secure, competitive and 
sustainable Energy Union”183 and by being incompatible with TEP184. The obvious 
question – and indeed the one asked by those in favour of NS2 – is whether the EU 
has the power to try and stop projects that go against its strategies. For instance, in 
2017 the Commission’s stance was that this was outside its mandate, as presented 
earlier. This question is nevertheless still at the heart of the debate on the 
Commission’s mandate to negotiate on NS2 on behalf of all Member States. Those in 
favour of the pipeline believe the Commission should not be able to do so. This same 
question applies to new legislation introduced, which is perceived to “target” NS2 as 
shown earlier in this chapter. 
Because it is a core principle of European energy policy, diversification is present in 
one form or another in the documents analysed from early on. For instance, in a 
Commission Staff Working Document relating to an in-depth study of European 
energy security it is stated that “[t]he key measure [to achieve energy security] in 
the medium term is the development of infrastructure granting priority to projects 
that allow higher diversification of suppliers of each of the Member States”185. The 
Energy Union Package highlights the importance of diversification in the changed 
European environment, stating that “[t]he political challenges over the last months 
have shown that diversification of energy sources, suppliers and routes is crucial for 
ensuring secure and resilient energy supplies”186. In similar vein, the First State of 
the Energy Union Report expresses concerns about the project specifically because 
it “would not give access to a new source of supply and would further increase 
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transmission capacity from Russia to the EU”187. The state of the EU-Russian 
relationship is thus undoubtedly crucial. 
Related to NS2, calls for prioritising diversification are apparent in a variety of 
documents.188 In parliamentary questions, diversification is explicitly mentioned in 
relation to NS2 from 2015 by, for instance, MEPs Fotyga, Paet, Gyürk, Vaidere, and 
Adam Szejnfeld (EPP, Poland).189 Diversification is brought up consistently in 
parliamentary questions in 2016, 2017 and 2018 as well, although less than in 
2015.190 Diversification is mentioned especially in relation to the eastern Member 
States, some of which rely 100 percent on Russia for their gas demand, as 
highlighted, for instance, in the EESS. 
Parliamentary questions presented challenge the Commission quite directly. For 
instance, MEP Poręba asks whether the Commission upholds its own opinion that 
“Nord Stream 2 does not help to increase security or diversification and thus cannot 
count on EU support”191. Flašíková-Beňová in turn states that “the Nord Stream 2 
project will be clear proof of the failure of one of the key objectives of the Energy 
Union — diversification”192.  
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An interesting feature of the diversification argument is that in the analysed 
documents there is no similar commentary regarding imports from Norway, which 
in 2017 amounted to 37,7 percent of all natural gas imports, only 0,8 percentage 
points less than imports from Russia, as shown in graph 1 on page XX. The most 
plausible reason for this is the very different kind of relationship the EU has with 
Norway compared to that it has with Russia. Norway, unlike Russia, is 
unconditionally understood to be a part of Europe and although it has remained 
outside the EU, it is an EEA member with access to the single market. Furthermore, 
as stated by Commission representative Klaus-Dieter Borchardt in an ITRE plenary 
session in 2017, as Norwegian imports are regulated by bilateral agreements 
between Norway and the destination country like Germany, there is no similar 
legislative void as perceived with NS2.193 The final main internally oriented 
argument accordingly relates to legislation and compliance with EU regulation.   
 
Regulation and strategy 
Arguments appealing to the EU’s regulation and strategy are overarching in the 
sense that they provide the framework for arguments appealing to solidarity and 
diversification, too. Thus, many documents appealing to solidarity and 
diversification also highlight that NS2 is against the general energy strategy of the 
EU.194 This is true for energy security as well, which can reasonably be argued to be 
the most important goal of the EU’s energy policy currently, as stated in chapter 2. 
Thus, in addition to solidarity and diversification, many actors argue that NS2 goes 
against “the underlying principles of a fully integrated, secure, competitive and 
sustainable Energy Union”195. 
As presented in the section discussing arguments supporting NS2, the plans for new 
gas market legislation have been met with some criticism and accusations of it being 
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discriminatory against NS2 specifically. It is clear that although the new Common 
rules for gas pipelines entering the EU internal market would apply to all pipelines, 
it has been motivated by concerns related to NS2. The Commission adopted the 
legislative proposal in late 2017. However, by the end of 2018, the agreed text was 
not yet formally approved by the Parliament and the Council.196 The core of the new 
legislation is to “apply EU internal gas market rules up to the border of the EU” and 
would require Member States to “cooperate with third countries to ensure full 
compliance with EU rules”197. As discussed, Germany has refused to agree bilaterally 
with Russia on regulatory questions regarding NS2, which this new legislation 
would now force Germany to do. By contrast, Poland has for long been an advocate 
of applying the same binding EU regulation to both domestic companies as well as 
gas suppliers from outside the EU,198 and MEP Fotyga’s and MEP Poręba’s 
arguments presented earlier in this thesis mirror well Poland’s general approach to 
gas market regulation. 
As already mentioned, official EU documents like reports by the major EU 
institutions, especially the Commission and the Council, for most of the time period 
under analysis only express concern and demand compliance with regulation. They 
also do not specify how oversight can be performed or what happens in case of non-
compliance. However, more recently, the stances expressed have become much 
more critical. Of particular interest here is the evolution of the Commission’s 
position on NS2. The Commission – while underlining NS2 needs to comply with EU 
regulation – took a fairly benign approach to the pipeline in the beginning: 
“The Commission considers Nord Stream 2 a commercial project and it 
will be for commercial parties to decide which infrastructure is viable for 
them. However, as with any other pipeline in the EU, this pipeline will 
have to fully respect EU law, in particular the Third Energy Package, as 
well as environmental, competition and public procurement rules.”199 
[emphasis added] 
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While the Commission was clearly wary of the project from the beginning, stating 
that “[i]f constructed, Nord Stream 2 would – according to the Commission's 
estimates – increase excess transmission capacity from Russia even further”200, it 
nevertheless took a less critical stance than many MEPs, for instance. Furthermore, 
the Commission has recognised the limits of its power, stating that it “is not in a 
position to prohibit the construction of individual infrastructure projects that 
comply with applicable Union law”201. However, the Commission’s stance has 
changed considerably and has led it to not only publicly oppose the construction of 
NS2, but also to propose new legislation. The main reasoning has been that the 
requirements laid out by the Commission from the beginning – specifically, the 
application of TEP – are not being fulfilled and thus the project cannot be supported. 
The Commission’s stance has thus transformed from viewing it as a commercial 
project, to “expressing concern”, to requesting a mandate for negotiations with 
Russia and proposing a legislative proposal on new gas pipeline regulation. 
The tension here is that despite the Parliament and the Commission openly oppose 
the construction of NS2, it does not mean the EU has the power to stop the project 
from happening. As established in existing literature, while the Commission is an 
internally strong actor in the energy sector, with strong policy tools at its disposal, 
it is a weak external actor. It suffers constantly from a lack of competence, and it 
does not have a strong mandate in the heterogeneous EU, where Member States 
have different interests and there are no coherent policy goals.202 Moreover, the 
Commission and the Parliament alone are unable to impose new energy market 
regulations, as explained in the second chapter: the Parliament and the Council must 
both approve new legislation through the process of ordinary legislative procedure. 
Here it is crucial to reiterate that discourse does not equal action, as is apparent from 
the case of the Council, which has expressed criticism of NS2 but still failed to pass 
new gas legislation that would affect the project. Nevertheless, as stated in the first 
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chapter, discourse is important even if it is only on the level of rhetoric, as any public 
discourse will affect political decision making in the future. Thus, the Council’s 
stance against NS2 should not be completely discounted.  
 
5.2. Natural gas as a foreign policy tool (externally oriented arguments) 
The analysed documents revealed two types of externally oriented political 
arguments supporting NS2. The first type is closely linked to the ideologization or 
politicization of debate and policy-making, as this is often seen to refer to Russia. 
MEP Schaffhauser’s (France, ENF) amendment suggestion presented earlier in this 
chapter makes this connection to Russia explicit.203 This can be argued to also 
closely relate to the securitisation of energy relations, covered in chapter 2.  
The second type of externally oriented arguments supporting NS2 relates to the role 
of Ukraine and the potential unreliability that the gas transit route through Ukraine 
presents:  
“[ITRE] says that ‘Russia can no longer be considered a reliable partner’. 
There is no reasonable justification for such accusations, as the Russian 
gas company Gazprom has honoured all its contracts to date.  
Surely the problem lies, rather, in repeated non-payment by the 
Ukrainian gas company Naftogaz? Is the Commission, therefore, willing 
to put pressure on Ukraine…and Naftogaz to ensure security of supply 
for the Member States?”204 
This argument relates to the 2006 and 2009 gas cut-offs. This question underlines 
that there is no unanimity within the Parliament that it is Russia who is responsible 
for lack of energy security in the EU – the implicit argument of those who oppose 
increased imports from Russia – but the unreliability of transit countries. This 
naturally links to the different perceptions of Russia that can be found within the 
EU. Although this specific question does not explicitly relate to NS2, some of its 
signatories have expressed supporting opinions earlier, for instance, MEPs Bay and 
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Schaffhauser. Furthermore, the expressed support to Russian imports suggests 
increased imports through NS2 would not be considered problematic. This question 
is also the only document discovered in this thesis which can be interpreted to 
support NS2 that has signatories from outside Germany and France; the MEPs 
represent Austria, France and the Netherlands. As these are all investor countries, 
this finding supports the existing literature.    
However, others see Ukraine’s role as a transit country as a priority and something 
that the EU should continue to support. Multiple documents show that the 
Parliament and the Council both support Ukraine’s role as a transit country. In 
already the First State of the Energy Union report, published in 2015, the Council 
stated that “[i]t is in the interest of all parties that Ukraine remains an important 
transit country”205. This of course again highlights the crucial difference between 
discourse and action: NS2 is expected to reduce gas transit through Ukraine. The 
importance of Ukraine fits thus better into the discourse by the Parliament and the 
Commission. Most recently, in late 2018 the Parliament reiterated “the crucial role 
of Ukraine in the European energy supply network”206. It is noteworthy that this 
phrasing in the final report was an amendment suggested by MEP Fotyga who, as 
established before, has been one of the most consistent and vocal opponents of 
NS2.207  
Ukraine’s role in the European gas transmission system is also often linked to 
appeals to solidarity as well as the iteration that NS2 is a political project without an 
economic basis. One of the most critical stances was presented by MEP Fotyga as 
early as mid-2015, when she stated that “Nord Stream is not an economic venture 
but a political tool that Russia is using to pursue aggressive policies towards its 
neighbours”208. The statement was made with reference to Putin’s announcement 
that gas transit through Ukraine will end by 2020, and the point was restated later 
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when MEP Fotyga remarked that classifying NS2 as an economic undertaking is an 
obvious lie.209 This reflects not only the general Polish perception of Russia but also 
the view of the Polish government, which has opposed the project from the 
beginning. For instance, the Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki has called 
NS2 a “poison pill” and “a weapon of hybrid warfare”210. In addition to the political 
side some MEPs have also pointed to the negative economic consequences that 
reduced gas transit would entail to Ukraine, highlighting the interconnectedness of 
economic arguments as well as internal and external political arguments. This is 
noted by, for instance, MEPs Zigmantas Balčytis (S&D, Lithuania) and Poręba.211 
Furthermore, MEP Kofod states that NS2 makes “a total Russian energy embargo on 
Ukraine” possible212.  
Russia’s ability to exert pressure on not only Ukraine but other neighbouring 
countries as well comes up as a justification to oppose NS2 in some of the analysed 
parliamentary questions. Pressure could be exerted by directing gas through NS2 
instead of through the current transit countries in Eastern Europe. This approach 
reflects the common European view that perceives Russia’s foreign policy as 
realpolitik driven, an approach which academic research often contrasts with the 
notion of the EU as a normative actor. It reflects the assumption that energy, as a 
crucial element to any country relying on energy imports, can be used and often is 
used as a foreign policy tool. Indeed, this assumption is explicitly expressed by the 
Council in the Energy Union Package.213 This argument is further echoed by some 
MEPs, including Jiří Pospíšil (the Czech Republic, EPP) who in 2018 asked “Is the 
Commission not concerned about the strengthening of Russia’s political position” 
because, among other factors, NS2 enables “the Russian government to put 
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economic pressure on Eastern European countries by limiting gas supplies through 
Ukraine and Belarus”214. This argument was expressed by MEP Vaidere in 2015 
already.215 Moreover, there have been some less specific arguments related to 
power relations and how NS2 might change them. For instance, in an amendment 
suggestion to an ITRE report MEP Jakub Dalunde (Sweden, on behalf of Verts/ALE 
Group) highlights “the geopolitical implications of the project” and “the risk to 
further destabilise Ukraine”216. Furthermore, as touched upon in the discussion on 
the diversification argument, NS2 is perceived to increase Germany’s dependence 
on Russian energy, which in turn would grant “Moscow stronger leverage for 
political blackmail against Berlin”, as argued by MEP Fotyga.217 This can be 
understood to be particularly worrying due to Germany’s strong role at the centre 
of the EU.  
Another externally oriented argument against NS2 uncovered is that the pipeline is 
not an economic venture but a political one. This argument has often been supported 
by evidence of unused existing capacity, as was done by MEPs Barekov and 
Krasnodębski in 2016 in the parliamentary question presented in chapter 3. It has 
to be noted, however, that the unused capacity argument is not as straight forward 
as it is made to seem, as it is at least partially due to EU regulation that requires third 
parties to have equal access to the distribution system, thus capping Gazprom’s 
ability to use OPAL, the onshore part of NS1, to 50 percent. Gazprom was 
subsequently allowed to increase its share to 80 percent in 2016, sparking criticism 
from Polish MEPs in particular, as presented in chapter 4.218 Futhermore, Jacek 
Saryusz-Wolski (Poland, EPP) points to the negotiations between President Putin 
and German Vice-Chancellor of the time Sigmar Gabriel in 2015, which he argues 
contradicts “the ’purely commercial’ nature of the project”219. Here it is once more 
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clear that the role of the German government is key to understanding the division 
within the Union.  
 
5.3. Broadening political opposition to Nord Stream 2 
As this chapter has made evident, the external arguments are very closely linked to 
the internal ones; for instance, diversification is inherently linked to the role of 
Russia in the EU’s energy mix while solidarity is a principle that can be extended to 
countries outside the EU’s borders, too. Particularly significant examples of this 
interconnectedness are two official EU documents, one by the Parliament and the 
other by AFET. Both take note of some external issues related to NS2, like the role of 
Ukraine, but also the target of diversification and security concerns:  
“[The European Parliament] Reiterates the crucial role of Ukraine in the 
European energy supply network; condemns the construction of the 
Nord Stream 2 pipeline, as it is a political project that poses a threat to 
European security and the efforts to diversify energy supply; calls for the 
project to be cancelled;”220 
“[The European Parliament] Underlines that Russia and the EU will 
remain key economic partners in the foreseeable future, but Nord Stream 
2 reinforces EU dependency on Russian gas supplies, threatens the EU 
internal market and is not in line with EU energy policy, and therefore 
needs to be stopped;”221 
It is noteworthy that these are not comments by individual MEPs but adopted 
Parliament statements. These recent documents reflect the perception that there is 
no improvement in EU-Russia relations in sight. Furthermore, only the latter 
statement is made after the incident on the Sea of Azov, highlighting the fact that the 
Parliament’s stance towards the project had already become very critical before that 
escalation. A final point that is especially noteworthy about both of these statements 
is the direct call to stop the project completely. Most analysed documents from the 
EU institutions – in other words, excluding amendments and Parliamentary 
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questions – only express concern and demand compliance with regulation instead 
of proposing blocking the project. These two documents thus represent a clear turn 
to a more active stance towards NS2. Combining these examples with the evolution 
of the Commission’s stance, outlined earlier in this chapter, it is clear that the 
Parliament and the Commission hold a much stricter stance against the project than 
the Council.  
As the above citations show, criticism of NS2 has only become stronger as the project 
has advanced. Indeed, the most radical comments regarding NS2 have been 
presented during 2018, the last year included in the analysis. Arguments from 2018 
also increasingly reflect a perception that the pipeline threatens European security 
not only in the energy sphere but more broadly. Although similar arguments have 
been voiced before, they nevertheless become more apparent in the more recent 
documents. Documents analysed from early 2018 onwards also call for a more 
active approach towards regulating NS2 and even openly support blocking the 
construction of NS2. This change reflects the continued mistrust between the EU and 
Russia – although the Sea of Azov conflict in late 2018 pushed the tension between 
the two actors even further, the frozen conflict instigated by the annexation of 
Crimea and dispute over the conflict in Eastern Ukraine had successfully instilled an 
ever-deepening atmosphere of mistrust in Europe already before this. For instance, 
Dariusz Rosati and Julia Pitera (Poland, EPP) suggest the Parliament should 
condemn “the construction of Nord Stream 2 project as it is a political project 
proposing a threat to security”222, while MEP Fotyga argues NS2 contributes to “de-
facto co-funding by European companies of Russia’s hybrid and conventional 
warfare capabilities“223.  
It should be highlighted that this line of argument is also present in European debate 
outside of the EU institutions. For instance, in April 2018, 33 representatives, from 
nine countries224 signed a written declaration in the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe titled “Nord Stream 2 and Russian gas: new tools of hybrid war”, 
where it was stated that:  
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“Recently leaked files from the European Commission show covered-up 
abusive behaviour in favour of Gazprom by Brussels (“The Telegraph” 
article on 12 April 2018). This fact confirms political background to 
control energy supply to the European Union by Russian gas monopolist 
in collusion with European law and covert support by European officials. 
… We would like to draw attention to Nord Stream 2 (NS2) project that 
is far from being purely a commercial venture. … The only purpose 
justifying Gazprom’s active engagement in redundant pipeline projects 
is to circumvent the traditional gas transmission routes through Ukraine, 
Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary to pursue a geopolitical agenda by the 
Russian government.”225 
The article referred to here reveals that Gazprom’s violations of EU law were 
deliberate and the company used its market power “fragment the EU’s unified 
energy market with coercive pricing policies”226. Furthermore, the discovered files 
are said to prove that Germany has benefitted from better trade deals with Russia 
at the expense of other EU states. Interestingly, no mention of this was discovered 
in the EU documents analysed. The reason could be that these accusations were not 
explicitly linked to NS2 and thus no documents referring to these revelations were 
found in the search. However, accounting for the strong opposition to NS2 within 
the EU, it is nevertheless curious that these accusations did not come up in the 
analysis of the intra-EU debate. 
Finally, it is important to touch upon the German opposition to NS2. The analysed 
documents highlight especially the role of Rebecca Harms (Verts/ALE). As a 
member of ITRE, MEP Harms has been well positioned to comment on the pipeline. 
She has argued against NS2 based on diversification, decarbonisation and Ukraine’s 
future prosperity.227 Furthermore, she has noted how Germany’s cooperation with 
Russia on NS2 has caused mistrust within the Union.228 It is also noteworthy that it 
was on MEP Harms who published the joint open letter on Nord Stream 2, addressed 
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to Chancellor Merkel.229 The letter asked the German government to withdraw its 
support to NS2, to show solidarity with the Union, and to follow the will of the 
Commission and the Parliament. It letter was signed by 69 MEPs from 21 countries 
representing five different political groups230 as well as some national MPs, 
highlighting the cross-border and cross-party opposition to NS2. 
As this chapter has made clear, majority of the debate on NS2 within the EU has been 
framed within what can be called a political context. As identified in this chapter, 
many arguments for and against the project are related to regulatory issues, EU 
values like solidarity, EU strategy including diversification, and external 
considerations like the role of Ukraine. This is in line with for instance Szulecki’s 
research, which argues it is exactly the internal dimension that receives the most 
attention in the EU’s energy policy, as opposed to the external dimension that 
regards, for instance, supplier relations.231 This is an interesting result as most of 
the media coverage, for instance, tends to quote the role of Gazprom and Russia as 
the most controversial factor of NS2. This is partly true – appeals to solidarity and 
diversification, for instance, are made in relation to Russia. Nevertheless, it is 
noteworthy that the debate in the EU has focused on the internal dimension as 
opposed to the external one. 
Furthermore, as highlighted on multiple occasions, the internal and external 
political dimensions are inherently interconnected. Additionally, as stated in the 
beginning of this chapter, it is important to note that political arguments very often 
appear together. Excellent examples of these are the 2016 written declaration by a 
group of 12 MEPs232, the 2018 parliamentary question by MEP Fotyga, and indeed 
the joint open letter published by MEP Harms. All of these documents list multiple 
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political arguments against NS2: internally oriented arguments like compatibility 
with TEP, principles of solidarity and trust, and goal of diversification, as well as 
externally oriented arguments like increased Russian leverage and negative 
consequences to Ukraine.   
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6. Conclusion 
 
This thesis has shown that it has been the opponents of NS2 which have dominated 
the discussion within the EU. The analysis revealed no arguments explicitly in favour 
of NS2 in neither the environmental nor the economic dimension, and even in the 
political dimension only a few documents supporting the pipeline project were 
discovered. As already discussed in the introduction, this could be partly because of 
a selection bias resulting from how the analysed documents were chosen. 
Furthermore, the nature of the parliamentary questions, which have been the main 
target of analysis, is often critical, perhaps because they are used in a way to raise 
debate and challenge the status quo. However, as all the main EU institutions have 
expressed concern of and even direct opposition to the project, the more plausible 
reason for the lack of arguments supporting NS2 is simply that only a few have been 
presented. This is explained by the fact that the main supporters of the pipeline 
project are the investor countries’ governments. Thus accordingly, the Council, 
which is formed by the representatives of Member States’ governments, had not 
approved new gas market legislation by the end of 2018. However, it is noteworthy 
that even the Council has expressed concern over NS2. Thus, even though the 
Council has been reluctant to take action regarding NS2, its future actions are 
constrained and it seems unlikely the Council would offer its support to the project 
at any point. 
The second central result of this thesis is that out of those opposing arguments, it 
has been arguments related to the internal political dimension that have been most 
often mobilised in the debate. Naturally, the ‘Russia factor’ is constantly present in 
these arguments too; for instance, arguments appealing to solidarity and 
diversification can almost always be argued to implicitly relate to Russia, even if it 
is not explicitly stated so. Thus, understanding the context of the currently tense EU-
Russian relations is crucial for understanding the debate around NS2. Nevertheless, 
it has been the internally oriented arguments that have dominated the debate. 
Arguments of solidarity and diversification, to use the same example as above, have 
been justified with references to the EU’s energy strategy and regulation, not 
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external policy. This highlights how energy policy can connect the domestic and the 
foreign policy levels, and is a truly multi-dimensional policy realm.  
Furthermore, this second central research result also highlights the importance of 
understanding the internal dynamics of the EU. Although the role that Russia plays 
in the European energy policy cannot be overestimated, it is clearly also crucial to 
pay attention to issues within the union. With reference to NS2, it seems to be 
particularly important to focus on the perceptions on and the role of Germany. This 
result supports the arguments presented by Vihma and Wigell, as presented in the 
introduction, as they also draw attention to Germany’s role and the possible 
consequences NS2 can have on Germany’s reputation within the EU. 
Although it has been the internal political arguments that have been the most 
prominent in the debate, the connections between the different dimensions are 
strong. Indeed, especially documents arguing against NS2 often use multiple 
arguments from different dimensions to make their case. The examples given at the 
end of chapter 5 show this well: documents can list, for instance, Ukraine’s role as a 
transit country, threats to energy security especially in Central and South-Eastern 
countries, environmental concerns, compatibility with TEP, Gazprom’s 
demonstrated abuse of market power, as well as the principles of solidarity, trust 
and diversification as reasons to oppose NS2.   
Moreover, as emphasised earlier, the classifications used here are non-exclusive and 
there is significant overlap between the different groups. This is most visible 
between the economic and political dimensions, and indeed the economy and 
politics should not be treated as clearly separated spheres. For instance, market 
liberalisation and monopoly policies are a political decision and although they can 
be backed up by economic theory, they could be defined as a question of 
prioritisation. Similarly, many economic questions relate to solidarity: does the EU’s 
solidarity lie with its eastern Members, who suffer negative economic impacts by 
NS2 in the form of losing transit fees, or its Western Members, to whom NS2 could 
deliver cheaper fuel? Should the EU compensate for those losses? What about the 
economic effects on the EU’s Eastern partner countries like Belarus and Ukraine? 
Although there is less overlap with the environmental dimension, as this thesis has 
shown, environmental arguments have typically been mobilised as “supporting 
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arguments” instead of main arguments, underlining the interconnectedness of the 
different dimensions. 
Thus, the classifications chosen here are very much interconnected and indeed 
sometimes it is difficult to tell which group an argument naturally falls into. Another 
division of arguments would have of course been possible. For instance, arguments 
could be classified into regulatory and strategy dimensions, where arguments 
related to, for instance, TEP and the new Gas Directive would fall under the first 
category and arguments related to, for example, solidarity and diversification would 
belong to the latter. However, a similar issue of overlapping classifications would 
probably affect this division as well. Indeed, the different dimensions of energy 
policy are so interconnected that struggles to classify arguments would probably 
emerge regardless of the chosen groups. The clarity of choosing the broad 
dimensions of environment, economics and politics, however, provide the most 
flexible framework for discovering new arguments and tying them into the existing 
research. Furthermore, for the documents analysed in this thesis, the three-
dimensional division was the best option. 
The analysis has not focused on a chronological presentation of arguments, except 
to illustrate the changing stances of the main EU institutions: the Commission, the 
Council and the Parliament. The reason that chronological analysis was not included 
is simply that, as is evident from the analysis of the different dimensions, the 
different arguments both for and against NS2 have been used throughout the period 
from 2012 to 2018, and no specific trend in their popularity was detected. Although, 
as highlighted in the end of chapter 5, the political arguments have changed 
somewhat and become more condemning in 2018 than they were in earlier years, 
they have dominated the debate from the beginning. 
Although not explicitly discussed, this thesis also reveals how the division within the 
EU mostly follows national borders, not political affiliations. This supports the 
argument that the division on NS2 is mostly apparent on an inter-governmental 
level as is clear from the Council’s reluctance to regulate NS2. The most vocal 
opponents of NS2 have been MEPs Fotyga, Poręba and Wiśniewska, all representing 
Poland. This fits well into the existing literature on NS2 that highlights especially 
Poland’s opposition to the pipeline. Other MEPs whose contributions to the debate 
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this thesis has touched upon more frequently are, for instance MEP Paet from 
Estonia and MEP Kofod from Denmark, which further confirms the existing idea of 
opposition to NS2 from the Baltic Countries and Denmark. This also underlines how 
opposition to NS2 is more closely connected to nationality than political affiliation, 
as these MEPs represent three different political groups: ALDE, ECR and S&D. 
However, it is also crucial to note that this claim is not always true. For 
representatives of those countries that on a governmental level support NS2, 
political affiliation can be observed to matter. Thus, not all of the opponents of NS2 
come from the transit countries, as is generally argued. For instance, the written 
declaration against NS2 presented at the end of chapter 5 featured signatures from 
the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden, but also Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Here it can be specified that on a general level, it 
is especially the representatives of Verts/ALE but also of ALDE and S&D who tend 
to oppose NS2 despite their national government’s possible support for the project. 
Furthermore, it should be highlighted in particular that there is considerably 
opposition to NS2 within Germany, as revealed by some of the analysed documents.  
This thesis does not argue that there is no division in the EU regarding NS2. Instead, 
it has shown that the division is perhaps not as deep as would appear, with many 
actors within the EU arguing against the project. Furthermore, it is important to 
avoid simple generalisations of those against and for the project. For instance, as 
stated above, although the German government has continued to support NS2, there 
is also considerable opposition to the project in Germany. And although not 
discussed in this thesis, Germany and France have received support for NS2 in the 
Council from, for example, Greece and Cyprus; however, most studies do not account 
for these countries and their perceptions of the pipeline. 
Thus, in order to fully understand European perceptions of NS2, it would be 
interesting to see a similar analysis conducted on national debates. The utilisation 
of the framework provided here – classifying arguments into environmental, 
economic and political groups – would allow insightful comparison to be made with 
the EU level. For instance, it would be interesting to see whether national debates 
have also been centred around the political dimension, or are environmental or 
economic arguments more prominent? Some work has already been done on the 
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national level. For instance, as discussed in the introduction, a framework utilising 
geoeconomics and geopolitics as the classifications have been applied in research 
on Sweden. Although the most vocal countries, for example, Germany and Poland, 
would be obvious and interesting targets of research, it is also important to include 
other countries such as Spain and Belgium in the analysis. The extent to which NS2 
has been debated in the less visible countries could offer interesting insights. The 
growing gas network interconnectivity within the EU means that NS2 might affect 
national markets more broadly in the EU, and thus no country should be excluded 
from the analysis. 
Another interesting path for research would be a comparative study of the discourse 
related to NS2 and one or more other pipeline projects in the EU. This thesis has 
shown that NS2 has been framed mostly in political terms – is this true for other 
pipeline projects? What are the differences between discussions on Russian 
pipelines and those originating from other partner countries like Norway or Algeria? 
This research could be conducted from two interesting but distinct approaches. 
Firstly, it would be interesting to see the research on the securitization of the EU’s 
energy policy implemented on a comparative case. Secondly, as this thesis has 
highlighted, the EU’s energy policy is a multidimensional issue, influenced by both 
the union’s internal dynamics as well as its external relations with supplier 
countries. Thus, future research could also explore these tensions in relation to 
different projects and supplier countries.  
This thesis represents the first systematic, in-depth analysis of the different 
arguments used to justify stances in favour of and opposing NS2. As the new gas 
market legislation is yet to be formally approved by the Council and the Parliament, 
and as the NS2 pipeline is not yet completed, the debate on the project is still very 
much ongoing. Thus, it remains to be seen whether individual Member States’ and 
EU institutions’ approaches will shift or remain the same, and whether new 
arguments for or against the pipeline will appear in the debate.  
83 
 
Bibliography 
 
Published primary sources  
Council of the European Union Document Register; 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/public-register/ 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (2017 Aug 2), “Draft report on a European 
Parliament recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the 
Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the November 2017 Summit”, PE 
607.922v01-00, Brussels. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-607.922+01+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN 
(Last accessed: 30 Mar 2019). 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (2018 Jun 11), “Amendments 201-387 – Draft report 
on the state of EU-US relations”, PE 623.691v01-00. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-623.691+01+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN 
(Last accessed: 30 Mar 2019). 
Council of European Union (2012 May 11), “Relations with Russia: Key outstanding 
issues for the EU in its relations with Russia”, ST 9822 2012 INIT, Brussels. 
Available at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9822-2012-
INIT/en/pdf (Last accessed: 25 Apr 2019) (Last accessed: 4 Apr 2019). 
Council of the European Union (2012 Dec 3), “Relations with Russia: Key 
outstanding issues for the EU in its relations with Russia”, ST 17083 2012 INIT, 
Brussels. Available at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-
17083-2012-INIT/en/pdf (Last accessed: 20 Apr 2019) (Last accessed: 30 Apr 
2019). 
Council of the European Union (2013 May 21), “Relations with Russia – Key 
outstanding issues for the EU in its relations with Russia”, ST 9619 2013 INIT, 
Brussels. Available at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9619-
2013-INIT/en/pdf (Last accessed: 20 Apr 2019) (Last accessed: 4 Apri 2019). 
Council of the European Union (2014 Jun 2), “Commission Staff Working Document 
- In-depth study of European Energy Security” Accompanying the document 
“Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
- European Energy Security Strategy””, ST 10409 2014 ADD 2, Brussels. Available 
at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10409-2014-ADD-
2/en/pdf (Last accessed: 15 Apr 2019) (Last accessed: 30 Mar 2019). 
Council of the European Union (2014 Jun 2), “Commission Staff Working Document 
- In-depth study of European Energy Security”, Accompanying the document 
“Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
84 
 
- European Energy Security Strategy””, ST 10409 2014 ADD 4, Brussels. Available 
at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10409-2014-ADD-
4/en/pdf (Last accessed: 30 Mar 2019). 
Council of the European Union (2015 Feb 26), “Energy Union Package: A 
framework strategy for a resilient energy union with a forward-looking climate 
change policy”, ST 6594 2015 INIT, Brussels. Available at: 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6594-2015-INIT/en/pdf 
(Last accessed: 4 Apr 2019). 
Council of the European Union (2015 Mar 2), “Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the short term 
resilience of the European gas system”, ST 14414 2014 REV 1, Brussels. 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14414-2014-REV-1/en/pdf  
(Last accessed: 4 Apr 2019). 
Council of the European Union (2015 Nov 19), “State of the Energy Union 2015”, 
ST 14015 2015 INIT, Brussels. Available at: 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14015-2015-INIT/en/pdf 
(Last accessed: 19 Apr 2019). 
Council of the European Union (2016 Oct 4), “Progress with the development of 
the external dimension of the EU energy policy”, ST 13290 2016 INIT, Brussels. 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13290-2016-INIT/en/pdf  
(Last accessed: 15 Mar 2019). 
Council of the European Union (2017 Feb 2), “Second report on the State of the 
Energy Union”, ST 5902 2017 INIT, Brussels. Available at: 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5902-2017-INIT/en/pdf 
(Last accessed: 4 Apr 2019). 
Council of the European Union (2017 Feb 27) “Outcome of the Council meeting: 
3521st Council meeting  - Transport, Telecommunications and Energy”, ST 6719 
2017 INIT, Brussels. Available at: 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6719-2017-INIT/en/pdf 
(Last accessed: 5 Apr 2019). 
Council of the European Union (2017 Jun 21), “Work programme of the incoming 
Presidency - Information from the Estonian delegation”, ST 9992 2017 INIT, 
Brussels. Available at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9992-
2017-INIT/en/pdf (Last accessed: 19 Mar 2019). 
Council of the European Union (2017 Jun 26), “3554 Transport, 
Telecommunications and Energy”, ST 10642 2017 INIT, Brussels. Available at: 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10642-2017-INIT/en/pdf 
(Last accessed: 4 May 2019). 
Council of the European Union (2017 Nov 27), “Third Report on the State of the 
Energy Union”, ST 14935 2017 INIT, Brussels. Available at: 
85 
 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14935-2017-INIT/en/pdf 
(Last accessed: 24 Apr 2019). 
Council of the European Union (2017 Oct 27), “Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Commission Work 
Programme 2018”, ST 13837 2017 INIT, Brussels. Available at: 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13837-2017-INIT/en/pdf 
(Last accessed: 4 Apr 2019). 
European Commission (2014 Oct 28), “Report from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council: On the implementation of the European 
Energy Programme for Recovery”, ST 14856 2014 INIT, Brussels. Available at: 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14856-2014-INIT/en/pdf 
(Last accessed: 4 Apr 2019). 
European Commission (2015 Nov 19), “Commission staff working document: On 
the European Energy Security Strategy”, ST 14355 2015 INIT, Brussels. Available 
at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14355-2015-INIT/en/pdf 
(Last accessed: 4 May 2019). 
Turmes, Claude, Auštrevičius, Petras, Bütikofer, Reinhard, Hökmark, Gunnar, 
Krasnodębski, Zdzisław, Landsbergis, Gabrielius, Poche, Miroslav, Ropé, Bronis, 
Saryusz-Wolski, Jacek, Telička, Pavel, van Baalen, Johannes Cornelis & Zanonato, 
Flavio (206 Jun 7), ”Written declaration submitted under Rule 136 of the Rules of 
Procedure on the doubling of the capacity of the Nord Stream pipeline”, 
PE576.680v01-00. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+WDECL+P8-DCL-2016-
0023+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN (Last accessed: 3 May 2019). 
 
European Parliament Committees Document Search; 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parlArchives/comArch/comDocSearch.do?langua
ge=EN  
Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) (2016 Jul 14), “Opinion on an EU strategy for 
liquefied natural gas and gas storage”, PE 582.256v03-00. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-582.256+03+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN  
(Last accessed: 2 Apr 2019). 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) (2016 Jun 15), “Amendments 9-46: Draft 
Opinion”, PE 584.262v01-00, European Parliament. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-584.262+01+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN  
(Last accessed: 4 Apr 2019). 
86 
 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) (2016 Jun 2), “Amendments 1-52 – Draft 
Opinion on an EU strategy for liquefied natural gas and gas storage”, PE 
583.931v01-00. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-583.931+01+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN 
(Last accessed: 2 Apr 2019). 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) (2017 Oct 16), “Report on a European 
Parliament recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the 
Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the November 2017 Summit”, PE 
607.922v02-00. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2017-
0308_EN.pdf?redirect (Last accessed: 12 Apr 2019). 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) (2017 Sep 19), “AMENDMENTS 1 - 232 - 
Draft report - Recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on 
the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the November 2017 Summit”, PE 
610.603v01-00. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-610.603+01+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN 
(Last accessed: 12 Apr 2019). 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) (2018 Jul 14), “Report on the state of EU-US 
relations”, PE 616.905v03-00. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-
0251_EN.pdf?redirect (Last accessed: 30 Mar 2019). 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) (2018 Nov 16), “Report on the 
implementation of the EU Association Agreement with Ukraine”, PE 622.304v02-
00. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-
0369_EN.pdf?redirect (Last accessed: 29 Mar 2019). 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) (2018 Nov 28), “Draft report on the state of 
EU-Russia political relations”, PE 630.526v01-00. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-630.526+01+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN  
(Last accessed: 24 Apr 2019). 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) (2018 Sep 10), “Amendments 1-174 – Draft 
report on implementation of the EU association agreement with Ukraine”, PE 
627.676v01-00. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-627.676+01+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN 
(Last accessed: 29 Mar 2019). 
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) (2016 Jun 16), “Amendments 
1-265 – EU strategy for liquefied natural gas and gas storage”, PE 584.007v02-00. 
Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
87 
 
//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-584.007+02+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN  
(Last accessed: 18 Apr 2019). 
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) (2016 May 10), “Draft Report 
on EU strategy for liquefied natural gas and as storage (2016/2059(INI))”, PE 
582.327v01-00. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-582.327+01+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN  
(Last accessed: 18 Apr 2019). 
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) (2016 Sep 29), “Report on EU 
strategy for liquefied natural gas and gas storage”, PE 582.327v02-00.  Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2016-
0278_EN.pdf?redirect  (Last accessed: 18 Apr 2019). 
 
European Parliament Plenary, Parliamentary Questions archive; 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html  
András Gyürk (2016 Dec 7), “Security of gas supply to Europe”, E-009261/2016. 
Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2016-
009261_EN.pdf (Last accessed: 22 Apr 2019). 
Auštrevičius, Petras (2016 Jun 3), ”Nord Stream II and its compatibility with the 
Third Energy Package in the territorial waters of Denmark and Germany”, P-
004621/2016. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-
8-2016-004621_EN.pdf (Last accessed: 22 Apr 2019).  
Auštrevičius, Petras, Hautala, Heidi, Fotyga, Anna Elżbieta, Paet, Urmas, Boştinaru, 
Victor, Kalniete, Sandra, Saryusz-Wolski, Jacek, Federley, Fredrick & Petersen, 
Morten Helveg (2015 Jul 13), “Plans for new Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic 
Sea”, E-011252/2015. Available at:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2015-011252_EN.pdf  
(Last accessed: 20 Apr 2019). 
Balčytis, Zigmantas (2015 Sep 17), “Increase in the volume of supply through the 
Nord Stream II gas pipeline”,  E-012882/2015. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2015-012882_EN.pdf  
(Last accessed: 20 Apr 2019). 
Barekov, Nikolay & Krasnodębski, Zdzisław (2016 Jan 21), “Impact of Nord Stream 
2 on the gas market in the CEE region”, O-000007/2016. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/O-8-2016-000007_EN.pdf  
(Last accessed: 21 Apr 2019). 
Bay, Nicolas, Schaffhauser, Jean-Luc, Monot, Bernard, Troszczynski, Mylène, 
Fontana, Lorenzo, Chauprade, Aymeric, Arnautu, Marie-Christine, Obermayr, 
Franz, de Graaff, Marcel, Maeijer, Vicky, Stuger, Olaf, Gollnisch, Bruno, Lebreton, 
Gilles, Jalkh, Jean-François  & Boutonnet, Marie-Christine (2015 Mar 31), 
88 
 
“Unreliability of our partnership with Ukraine”, E-005475/2015. Available at:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2015-005475_EN.pdf (Last 
accessed: 2 May 2019). 
Beňová, Monika (2018 Nov 30), “EU-Russia political relations”, E-006081/2018. 
Available at:  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-
006081_EN.pdf  (Last accessed: 12 Apr 2019). 
Cañete, Arias (2017 Sep 4 a), “Answer on behalf of the Commission”, E-
001744/2016(ASW). Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2016-001744-
ASW_EN.html (Last accessed: 3 May 2019).  
Cañete, Arias (2017 Sep 4 b), “Answer on behalf of the Commission”, E-
004024/2017(ASW). Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2017-004024-
ASW_EN.html (Last accessed: 2 May 2019). 
Cañete, Arias (2018 Jan 5), “Answer on behalf of the Commission”, P-
007147/2017(ASW). Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-2017-007147-
ASW_EN.html (Last accessed: 2 May 2019).  
Cañete, Arias (2018 Sep 24), “Answer on behalf of the Commission”, E-
003988/2018(ASW). Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-003988-
ASW_EN.html (Last accessed: 2 May 2019).  
Casa, David (2015 Oct 20), “Russia’s Gazprom deal”, E-013974/2015. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2015-013974_EN.pdf  
(Last accessed: 22 Apr 2019). 
Czesak, Edward (2016 Jan 12), “Commission’s stance on Nord Stream 2”, E-
000193/2016. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-
8-2016-000193_EN.pdf  (Last accessed: 20 Apr 2019). 
Czesak, Edward (2016 Dec 12), “Gas pipeline investment in the Baltic Sea”, E-
009344/2016. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-
8-2016-009344_EN.pdf (Last accessed: 14 Apr 2019). 
Czesak, Edward & Krasnodębski, Zdzisław (2016 Nov 17), “Commission decision 
on the OPAL pipeline”, P-008639/2016. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-2016-008639_EN.pdf  
(Last accessed: 28 Apr 2019). 
Ferber, Markus (2017 Oct 22), “Ensuring that the rule of law governs approval 
procedures in the case of the Nord Stream 2 project”, E-001940/2017. Available at:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2017-001940_EN.pdf   
(Last accessed: 25 Apr 2019). 
89 
 
Flašíková-Beňová, Monika (2016 Feb 29), "Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project“, E-
001744/2016. Available at:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-
questions.html#sidesForm  (Last accessed: 25 Apr 2019). 
Flašíková-Beňová, Monika (2017 Mar 31), "Nord Stream 2“, E-002393/2017. 
Available at:  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2017-
002393_EN.pdf  (Last accessed: 22 Apr 2019). 
Fleckenstein, Knut (2017 Jun 19), “Politicisation of major European energy 
projects such as Nord Stream 2”, E-004024/2017. Available at:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2017-004024_EN.pdf  
(Last accessed: 28 Apr 2019). 
Fotyga, Anna Elżbieta (2015 Jun 25), ”New lines for the Nord Stream gas pipeline”, 
P-010326/2015. Available at:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-2015-010326_EN.pdf  
(Last accessed: 18 Apr 2019). 
Fotyga, Anna Elżbieta (2015 Sep 30), “VP/HR - Propaganda war and the activities 
of the East StratCom Team”, E-013396/2015. Available at:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2015-013396_EN.pdf (Last 
accessed: 29 Apr 2019). 
Fotyga, Anna Elżbieta (2017 Jul 25), ”Do new US sanctions against Russia have a 
real chance of halting the anti-European Nord Stream 2 project?”, E-005078/2017. 
Available at:  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2017-
005078_EN.pdf  (Last accessed: 8 Apr 2019). 
Fotyga, Anna Elżbieta (2018 Jul 11), “Ten threats posed by the possible 
construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline”, P-003817/2018. Available at:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-2018-003817_EN.pdf 
Gieseke, Jens (2017 Jun 14), “Possible negotiations with Russia on Nord Stream 2”, 
E-003946/2017. Available at:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2017-003946_EN.pdf  
(Last accessed: 12 Apr 2019). 
Gróbarczyk, Marek Józef & Wiśniewska, Jadwiga (2015 Jul 17), “VP/HR - 
Commission's view on plans to increase supplies from Gazprom”, E-011499/2015. 
Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2015-
011499_EN.pdf (Last accessed: 25 Apr 2019). 
Gróbarczyk, Marek Józef (2015 Sep 10), ”Nord Stream 2 agreement and the third 
energy package”, E-012736/2015. Available at:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2015-012736_EN.pdf  
(Last accessed: 12 Apr 2019). 
90 
 
Gyürk, András (2015 Sep 30), “Compliance of energy contracts with EU law”, P-
013363/2015. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-
8-2015-013363_EN.pdf  (Last accessed: 22 Apr 2019). 
Hökmark, Gunnar (2016 Oct 11), “Energy Union and Nord Stream 2”, E-
007689/2016. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-
8-2016-007689_EN.pdf (Last accessed: 13 Apr 2019). 
Jakovčić, Ivan (2016 Feb 9), “Nord Stream expansion”, E-001169/2016. Available 
at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2016-001169_EN.pdf 
(Last accessed: 28 Mar 2019). 
Jávor, Benedek (2015 Feb 27), “Is the Hungarian-Russian energy cooperation 
compatible with the EU's energy security strategy?”, E-003118/2015. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2015-003118_EN.pdf (Last 
accessed: 5 Apr 2019). 
Karski, Karol (2015 May 21), “Use of the Opal gas pipeline and energy security”, E-
000770/2015. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-
8-2015-000770_EN.pdf (Last accessed: 25 Apr 2019). 
Kofod, Jeppe (2015 Dec 17), “Nord Stream II”, P-015951/2015. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-2015-015951_EN.pdf  
(Last accessed: 29 Apr 2019). 
Kofod, Jeppe (2017 Mar 27), “Rejection of Nord Stream 2 project on grounds of 
European security”, P-002042/2017. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-2017-002042_EN.pdf  
(Last accessed: 29 Apr 2019). 
Kovatchev, Andrey & Urutchev, Vladimir (2015 Jul 2), ”Energy security and 
whether the Turkish Stream/ Greek Stream project and the extension of Nord 
Stream are compatible with the Third Energy Package”, P-010711/2015. Available 
at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-2015-010711_EN.pdf  
(Last accessed: 3 Apr 2019). 
Marusik, Michał (2018 Jul 17), “Commission’s stance on the construction of the 
Nord Stream 2 pipeline“, E-003988/2018. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-003988_EN.pdf  
(Last accessed: 3 May 2019). 
Ożóg, Stanisław, Wiśniewska, Jadwiga, Wojciechowski, Janusz & Kuźmiuk, 
Zbigniew (2015 Oct 2), “Threats for Central and Eastern European countries 
arising from the signature of an agreement on the construction of the Nord Stream 
2 pipeline in Vladivostok”, P-013463/2015. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-2015-013463_EN.pdf (Last 
accessed: 2 May 2019). 
Paet, Urmas (2015 Sep 17) “Diversification of the European Union's energy supply 
sources, and Gazprom agreement”, E-012869/2015. Available at: 
91 
 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2015-012869_EN.pdf (Last 
accessed: 25 Apr 2019). 
Paet, Urmas (2016 Jul 12), “Building of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline”, E-
005643/2016. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-
8-2016-005643_EN.pdf  (Last accessed: 25 Apr 2019). 
Paet, Urmas (2017 March 27), ”The conformity of Nord Stream 2 to the Energy 
Union gals”, E-002076/2017. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2017-002076_EN.pdf  
(Last accessed: 26 Apr 2019). 
Poręba, Tomasz Piotr (2016 May 20), “Nord Stream 2”, E-004094/2016. Available 
at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2016-004094_EN.pdf  
(Last accessed: 29 Apr 2019). 
Poręba, Tomasz Piotr (2016 Jun 3), "Nord Stream 2“, E-004644/2016. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2016-004646_EN.pdf  
(Last accessed: 30 Apr 2019). 
Poręba, Tomasz Piotr (2016 Oct 31), “OPAL pipeline capacity made available to 
Gazprom”, E-008210/2016. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2016-008210_EN.pdf (Last 
accessed: 18 Apr 2019). 
Pospíšil, Jiří (2018 Jul 20), “The EU’s position on the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline“, 
E-004084/2018. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-004084_EN.pdf  
(Last accessed: 22 Apr 2019). 
Saryusz-Wolski, Jacek (2015 Dec 3), “Compatibility of the project for doubling the 
Nord Stream (NSII) capacity with EU energy security priorities”, P-015380/2015. 
Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-2015-
015380_EN.pdf (Last accessed: 22 Apr 2019). 
Saryusz-Wolski, Jacek, Andrikienė, Laima Liucija, Auštrevičius, Petras, 
Krasnodębski, Zdzisław, Tarand, Indrek, Turmes, Claude & Saudargas, Algirdas 
(2018 May 17) “Gazprom’s acquittal instead of sanctions”, P-002663/2018. 
Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-2018-
002663_EN.pdf (Last accessed: 18 Apr 2019). 
Škripek, Branislav (2016 Jan 15), “Benefits and risks of the Nord Stream project“, 
E-000291/2016. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2016-000291_EN.pdf (Last 
accessed: 22 Apr 2019). 
Szejnfeld, Adam (2015 Sep 10), “EU energy security and Nord Stream 2”, P-
012711/2015. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-
8-2015-012711_EN.pdf  (Last accessed: 18 Apr 2019). 
92 
 
Ujazdowski, Kazimierz Michał (2018 Dec 18), “The EU's interests in, and the 
quality of, the Eastern Partnership in the implementation of the Nord Stream 2 
project”, E-006363/2018/rev.1. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-006363_EN.pdf (Last 
accessed: 5 Apr 2019). 
Vaidere, Inese (2015 Dec 15), “Compatibility of Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline with 
the European Energy Union”, P-015778/2015. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-2015-015778_EN.pdf  
(Last accessed: 30 Apr 2019). 
Winkler, Hermann & Zeller, Joachim (2017 Jul 5), "Legal framework conditions for 
Nord Stream 2 and similar gas pipelines“, E-004577/2017. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2017-004577_EN.pdf  
(Last accessed: 18 Apr 2019). 
Winkler, Hermann & Zeller, Joachim (2017 Nov 21), “Compliance with 'better 
regulation' standards by the European Commission”, P-007147/2017. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-2017-007147_EN.pdf (Last 
accessed: 1 May 2019). 
Wiśniewska, Jadwiga (2018 May 23), “Nord Stream 2 violating the principle of 
energy solidarity”, P-002729/2018. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-2018-002729_EN.pdf  
(Last accessed: 3 May 2019). 
 
Council of Europe 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (2018), ”Nord Stream 2 and Russian 
gas: new tools of hybrid war”, Written declaration No. 659. Available at: 
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-
en.asp?fileid=24764&lang=en (Last accessed: 2 May 2019).  
 
Entsog 
Entsog (2018), “Ten-year network development plan 2018 – executive summary”. 
Available at: https://www.entsog.eu/sites/default/files/2018-
12/ENTSOG_TYNDP_2018_Executive%20Summary_web.pdf (Last accessed: 5 May 
2019).  
 
Eurogas 
Eurogas (2019), “Policy priorities”. Available at: https://eurogas.org/policy-
priorities/ (Last accessed: 2 May 2019). 
 
European Union 
93 
 
”Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union” 
(2016), Official Journal C202, 7 Jun 2016, p.134. Available at:  https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2016/oj (Last accessed: 2 May 2019).  
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) (2017 Oct 11), ”Committee 
meeting”, European Parliament TV, ITRE/8/11151 2017. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/committees/video?event=20171011-
1430-COMMITTEE-ITRE (Last accessed: 3 May 2019).  
Council of the European Union (2018), ”Voting system”. Available at: 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/ (Last accessed: 
3 May 2019). 
Council of the European Union (2019), ”EU restrictive measures in response to the 
crisis in Ukraine”. Available at: 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/ (Last 
accessed: 3 May 2019). 
European Commission (2011), ” Questions and answers on the third legislative 
package for an internal EU gas and electricity market”, Memo/11/125, 2 Mar 2011. 
Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-
125_en.htm?locale=en (Last accessed 2 Apr 2019). 
European Commission (2014), ”European Energy Security Strategy”, COM(2014) 
330 final, Brussels. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0330&from=EN (Last accessed: 30 
Apr 2019). 
European Commission (2016a), “Clean energy for all Europeans”, COM(2016) 860 
final, 30 Nov 2016. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1512481277484&uri=CELEX:52016DC0860 (Last 
accessed: 3 May 2019). 
European Commission (2016b), “EU Reference Scenario 2016 – Energy, transport 
and GHG emissions, trends to 2050”. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/ref2016_report_final-
web.pdf (Last accessed: 30 Mar 2019). 
European Commission (2017), ”Nord Stream 2 – Divide et impera again? Avoiding 
a zero-sum game”, European Political Strategy Centre. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/sites/epsc/files/epsc_-_nord_stream_-
_divide_et_impera_again.pdf (Last accessed 20 Apr 2019). 
European Commission (2018a), “A Clean Planet for all - A European strategic long-
term vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate neutral economy”, 
COM(2018) 773 final, 28 Nov 2018. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/docs/pages/com_2018_733_en.pdf 
(Last accessed: 3 May 2019).  
European Commission (2018b), “In-depth analysis in support of the Commission 
communication COM(2018) 773”. Available at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/docs/pages/com_2018_733_analysis
_in_support_en_0.pdf (Last accessed: 30 Mar 2019). 
94 
 
European Commission (2018c), “Quarterly report on European gas markets”, 
Market Observatory for Energy, 10:4. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/quarterly_report_on_eu
ropean_gas_markets_q4_2017_final_20180323.pdf (Last accessed: 3 May 2019). 
European Commission (2018d), “Quarterly report on European gas markets”, 
Market Observatory for Energy, 11:2. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/quarterly_report_on_eu
ropean_gas_markets_q2_2018.pdf (Last accessed: 3 May 2019). 
European Commission (2018e), “Quarterly report on European gas markets”, 
Market Observatory for Energy, 11:3. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/quarterly_report_on_eu
ropean_gas_markets_q3_2018.pdf (Last accessed: 3 May 2019). 
European Commission (2019a), ”Energy Union: Commission welcomes tonight’s 
provisional political agreement to ensure that pipelines with third countries 
comply with EU gas rules”, Press release, Brussels, 12 Feb 2019. Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1069_en.htm (Last accessed 30 Apr 
2019). 
European Commission (2019b), ”Fourth report on the State of the Energy Union”, 
Brussels. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/fourth-report-state-of-energy-union-april2019_en_0.pdf (Last 
accessed: 29 Apr 2019). 
European Commission (n.d. a), ”Energy security”. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-security (Last accessed 30 Apr 
2019).  
European Commission (n.d. b), ”Progress made in cutting emissions”. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/progress_en (Last accessed: 30 
Apr 2019). 
European Parliament (2017), ”Gazprom’s controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline”, At 
a Glance, European Parliamentary Research Service. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/608629/EPRS_AT
A%282017%29608629_EN.pdf. 
European Parliament (2019), “Common rules for gas pipelines entering the EU 
internal market”, Briefing – EU legislation in process. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/614673/EPRS_BRI(
2018)614673_EN.pdf (Last accessed: 3 May 2019). 
European Union (2019), ”How EU decisions are made”. Available at: 
https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/decision-making/procedures_en (Last 
accessed: 3 May 2019).  
 
Eurostat 
Eurostat (2010), “Glossary: Energy dependency rate”. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
95 
 
explained/index.php/Glossary:Energy_dependency_rate (Last accessed: 5 May 
2019).  
Eurostat (2018), “EU imports of energy products – recent developments”. Available 
at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/EU_imports_of_energy_products_-_recent_developments 
(Last accessed: 4 May 2019).  
Eurostat (2019) “Energy dependence”. Available at:  
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=t2020_rd320&lang=en 
(Last accessed: 5 May 2019).  
 
Gazprom 
Gazprom (2017), ”Nord Stream 2”. Available at: 
http://www.gazprom.com/projects/nord-stream2/ (Last accessed: 15 Mar 2019).  
Gazprom (2019), ”Shares”. Available at: 
http://www.gazprom.com/investors/stock/ (Last accessed: 30 Apr 2019).  
 
Nord Stream 2 AG 
NS2 AG (2017), “Espoo report – non-technical summary”. Available at: 
https://www.nord-stream2.com/en/pdf/document/50/ (Last accessed: 30 Apr 
2019). 
NS2 AG (2018), “Questions and answers: Nord Stream 2 – a new natural gas 
pipeline through the Baltic Sea”. Available at: https://www.nord-
stream2.com/en/pdf/document/38/ (Last accessed: 29 Mar 2019).  
NS2 AG (2019a), “International consultation process”. Available at: 
https://www.nord-stream2.com/environment-permitting/international-
consultation-process/ (Last accessed: 15 Apr 2019). 
NS2 AG (2019b), ”Project background”. Available at: https://www.nord-
stream2.com/en/pdf/document/4/ (Last accessed: 30 Apr 2019).  
NS2 AG (2019c), “The pipeline at a glance“. Available at: https://www.nord-
stream2.com/en/pdf/document/198/ (Last accessed: 30 Apr 2019).  
NS2 AG (2019d), “Why Europe needs Nord Stream 2”. Available at: 
https://www.nord-stream2.com/project/rationale/ (Last accessed: 3 May 2019). 
 
Rebecca Harms’ webpage 
”Joint open letter regarding Nord Stream 2 to German Chacnellor Angela Merkel” 
(2018 Nov 6). Available at: https://rebecca-harms.de/post/joint-open-letter-
96 
 
regarding-nord-stream-2-to-german-chancellor-angela-merkel-57995 (Last 
accessed: 4 May 2019).  
 
Newspapers & media 
"Poland's anti-monopoly office Opens proceedings against Nord Stream 2." Reuters, 
9 May 2018. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gazprom-
poland/polands-anti-monopoly-office-opens-proceedings-against-nord-stream-2-
idUSKBN1IA1FC (Last accessed: 27 Apr 2019). 
“Germany to back Nord Stream 2 despite Ukraine tensions”, Euractiv, 4 Dec 2018. 
Available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/germany-to-back-
nord-stream-2-despite-ukraine-tensions/ (Last accessed: 27 Apr 2019). 
”Factbox: Who is Dmitry Medvedev, Putin’s nominee for prime minister?”, Reuters, 
7 May 2018. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin-
inauguration-medvedev-fa/factbox-who-is-dmitry-medvedev-putins-nominee-for-
prime-minister-idUSKBN1I817Y (Last accessed: 27 Apr 2019). 
”Polish PM calls Nord Stream 2 ’weapon’ of hybrid warfare”, RFE/RL, 28 May 2018. 
Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/polish-pm-calls-nord-stream-2-weapon-of-
hybrid-warfare/29255392.html (Last accessed: 27 Apr 2019). 
”Putin relative appointed to management of state gas giant Gazprom”, Reuters, 23 
Mar 2018. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin-
gazprom-idUSKBN1GZ273 (Last accessed: 27 Apr 2019).  
Astrasheuskaya, Nastassia (2019), ”Nord Stream 2 applies for third Baltic Sea 
route in two years”, Financial Times, 15 Apr 2019. Available at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/8c665f36-5f7d-11e9-a27a-fdd51850994c (Last 
accessed: 27 Apr 2019). 
Bershidsky, Leonid (2019), ”No, France and Germany haven’t fallen out”, 
Bloomberg, 8 Feb 2019. Available at: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-02-08/france-germany-
haven-t-fallen-out-over-nord-stream-2-pipeline (Last accessed: 27 Apr 2019). 
Buck, Tobias (2018), ”Nord Stream 2: Gas pipeline from Russia that’s dividing 
Europe”, Irish Times, 21 Jul 2018. Available at: 
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/nord-stream-2-gas-pipeline-
from-russia-that-s-dividing-europe-1.3571552 (Last accessed: 27 Apr 2019).  
Chee, Yun Foo & de Carbonnel, Alissa (2018), “EU ends antitrust case against 
Gazprom without fines”, Reuters, 24 May 2018. Available at: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-gazprom-antitrust-idUSKCN1IP1IV (Last 
accessed: 27 Apr 2019).  
Detrick, Hallie (2019), ”U.S. Threatens to Sanction German Firms Constructing 
Russian Gas Pipeline”, Fortune, 14 Jan 2019. Available at: 
97 
 
http://fortune.com/2019/01/14/nord-stream-2-sanctions/ (Last accessed: 27 
Apr 2019). 
Eckert, Vera (2019), “German gas demand seen rising due to coal exit plan”, 
Reuters, 6 Feb 2019. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-energy-
eworld-fair-gas-idUSKCN1PV155 (Last accessed: 27 Apr 2019). 
Evans-Pritchard, Ambrose (2018), ”Leaked EU files show Brussels cover-up and 
collusion on Putin's Gazprom abuses”, Telegraph, 12 Apr 2018. Available at: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2018/04/12/leaked-eu-files-show-
brussels-cover-up-collusion-putins-gazprom/ (Last accessed: 28 Apr 2019).  
Keating, Dave (2019), ”Why did France just save Nord Stream 2?”, Forbes, 8 Feb 
2019. Available at: 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davekeating/2019/02/08/why-did-france-just-
save-nord-stream-2/#3b1c40e76055 (Last accessed: 27 Apr 2019). 
Meier, Albrecht, von Marshall, Christoph, von Salzen, Claudia, Heorld, Frank & 
Schlandt, Jakob (2019), ”France now against Nord Stream 2”, Euractiv, 8 Feb 2019,  
Available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/france-now-
against-nord-stream-2/ (Last accessed: 27 Apr 2019). 
Nienaber, Michael (2016), “Germany’s Steinmeier favors gradual phasing-out of 
Russia sanctions”, Reuters, 9 Jun 2016. Available at: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-germany-steinmeier-
idUSKCN0Z50AI (Last accessed: 27 Apr 2019). 
Simon, Frédéric (2019), “Cañete sees gas as ‘a bridge’ to reach EU’s clean energy 
goals”, Euractiv, 11 Feb 2019. Available at: 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/climate-strategy-2050/news/canete-sees-gas-
as-a-bridge-to-reach-eus-clean-energy-goals/ (Last accessed: 27 Apr 2019). 
 
 
Literature  
Aalto, Pami & Westphal, Kristen (2007), “Introduction” in Aalto, Pami (ed.), The 
EU-Russian Energy Dialogue: Europe’s Future Energy Security, pp. 1-37, Ashgate: 
Hampshire. Available at: https://www.dawsonera.com/abstract/9780754686293 
(Last accessed: 3 May 2019). 
Amossy, Ruth (2009), ”Argumentation in discourse: a socio-discursive approach to 
arguments”, OSSA Conference Archive, 1. Available at: 
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA8/keynotes/1 (Last accessed: 15 
Mar 2019).  
Andersen, Svein S., Goldthau, Andreas & Sitter, Nick (eds.) (2017), Energy Union – 
Europe’s New Liberal Mercantilism?, Palgrace Macmillan: London. 
98 
 
Ang, Beng, Choong, Desmond, & Ng, Adam Tsan Sheng (2015), ”Energy security: 
definitions, dimensions and indexes”, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 
42, pp.1977-1093. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2014.10.064 (Last 
accessed: 16 Apr 2019). 
Balzacq, Thierry (2015), ”The ’essence’ of securitization: Theory, ideal type, and a 
socialogical science of security”, International Relations, 29:1, pp. 101-113. 
Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117814526606b (Last accessed: 20 
Apr 2019). 
Bankwatch Network (n.d.), “Southern Gas Corridor”. Available at: 
https://bankwatch.org/project/southern-gas-corridor-euro-caspian-mega-
pipeline (Last accessed: 3 May 2019). 
Barnes, Alex (2017), ”Nord Stream 2 – friend or enemy of energy security in 
Europe?”, IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc, St. Louis. Available at: 
https://ideas.repec.org/p/eps/cepswp/13325.html (Last accessed: 30 Apr 2019). 
Bilgin, Mert (2011), ”Energy security and Russia’s gas strategy: The symbiotic 
relationship between the state and firms”, Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies, 44, p.119. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2011.04.002 (Last accessed: 29 Apr 2019).  
Bouvarovksi, Stefan & Konieczny, Marcin (2010), ”Landscapes of paradox: public 
discourses and policies in Poland's relationship with the Nord Stream pipeline”, 
Geopolitics, 15:1, pp.1-21. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14650040903420362 (Last accessed: 29 Apr 2019). 
Börzel, Tanja (2003), "Shaping and Taking EU Policies: Member State Responses to 
Europeanization," Queen's Papers on Europeanisation, p0035, Queens University 
Belfast. Available at: https://ideas.repec.org/p/erp/queens/p0035.html (Last 
accessed: 25 Apr 2019). 
Casier, Tom (2013a), ”Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands”, ch. 8, pp.118-
131 in David, Maxine, Gower, Jackie, & Haukkala, Hiski (eds.) (2013), National 
Perspectives on Russia: European Foreign Policy in the Making?, Routledge: London. 
Casier, Tom (2013b), ”The EU–Russia Strategic Partnership: Challenging the 
Normative Argument”, Europe-Asia Studies, 65:7, pp.1377-1395. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2013.824137 (Last accessed: 3 May 2019). 
Casier, Tom (2016), “From logic of competition to conflict: understanding the 
dynamics of EU-Russia relations”, Contemporary Politics, 22:3, pp.376-394. 
Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2016.1201311 (Last accessed: 30 
Mar 2019). 
Casier, Tom (2018), ”Russia and Europe. Back to where we began or a new order in 
the making?”, Keynote lecture at BASEES/Uppsala Conference 2018: Regimes and 
Societies in Conflict: Eastern Europe and Russia since 1956, Uppsala, 13 Sep 2018. 
99 
 
Cichocki, Bartosz (2013), ”Poland”, ch. 6, pp.86-100 in David, Maxine, Gower, 
Jackie, & Haukkala, Hiski (eds.) (2013), National Perspectives on Russia: European 
Foreign Policy in the Making?, Routledge: London. 
David, Maxine, Gower, Jackie, & Haukkala, Hiski (eds.) (2013), National 
Perspectives on Russia: European Foreign Policy in the Making?, Routledge: London.  
Estrada, Javier, Moe, Arild & Martinsen, Kåre Dahl (1995), The Development of 
European Gas Markets: Environmental, Economic and Political Perspectives, Wiley.  
European Environment Agency (2018), ”Primary energy consumption by fuel”. 
Available at: 
https://www.eea.europa.eu/downloads/72dc82643aaf4df287798837ed583be4/
1548936315/assessment-2.pdf (Last accessed: 30 Mar 2019). 
Forsberg, Tuomas (2016), The European Union and Russia, Palgrave: London. 
Fransson, Anna-Lisa S., Faldner, Ingemar & Lidskog, Rolf (2010), ”Framing issues 
and forming opinions: the Baltic Sea pipeline in the Swedish media”, European 
Spatial Research and Policy, 18:2, pp.95-110. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.2478/v10105-011-0015-y (Last accessed: 29 Apr 2019). 
Giuli, Marco (2018), ”Nord Stream 2: Rule no more, but still divide”, Issue Paper, 
European Policy Centre: Brussels. Available at: 
http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_8613_nordstream2.pdf?doc_id=201
0 (Last accessed: 1 May 2019). 
Goldthau, Andreas (2016), ”Assessing Nord Stream 2: regulation, geopolitics & 
energy security in the EU, Central Eastern Europe and the UK”, Strategy Paper 10-
2016, King’s Russia Institute & Department of War Studies, Kings College London. 
Available at: 
https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/research/groups/eucers/p
ubs/strategy-paper-10.pdf (Last accessed: 28 Apr 2019).  
Hafner, Manfred & Tagliapietra, Simone (2016), The Future of European Gas 
Markets: Balancing Act Between Decarbonisation and Security of Supply, Claeys & 
Casteels Law Publishers: Deventer. 
Haukkala, Hiski (2010), The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership: The Limits of Post-
Sovereignty in International Relations, Routledge: London. 
Hofmann, Stephanie C. & Staeger, Ueli (2019) ”Frame contestation and collective 
securitisation: the case of EU energy policy”, West European Politics, 42:2, pp. 323-
345. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2018.1510197 (Last 
accessed: 20 Apr 2019). 
Howarth, Robert W. (2014), “A bridge to nowhere: methane emissions and the 
greenhouse gas footprint of natural gas”, Energy Science & Engineering, 2:2, pp. 47-
61. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1002/ese3.35 (Last accessed: 30 Apr 2019). 
100 
 
International Energy Agency (2019), “What is energy security?”. Available at: 
https://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/whatisenergysecurity/ (Last 
accessed: 3 May 2019).  
International Energy Charter (2019), “The Energy Charter Treaty”. Available at: 
https://energycharter.org/process/energy-charter-treaty-1994/energy-charter-
treaty/ (Last accessed: May 2019). 
Itälä, Pekka (2008), ”’Meille tämä kaasuputki ei ole ulko- ja turvallisuuspoliittinen 
kysymys’ – Nord Stream –kaasuputkihanke Suomen lainsäädännössä ja 
eduskunnan puheenvuoroissa vuosina 2005-2010”, Master’s thesis, University of 
Helsinki. Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10138/232868 (Last accessed: 29 Apr 
2019). 
Judge, A. & Maltby, T. (2017), ” European Energy Union? Caught between 
securitisation and ‘riskification’”, European Journal of International Security, 2:2, 
pp. 179-202. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2017.3 (Last accessed: 20 
Apr 2019). 
Judge, Andrew, Maltby, Tomas & Sharples, Jack D. (2016), “Challenging 
reductionism in analyses of EU-Russia energy relations”, Geopolitics, 21:4, pp. 751-
762. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2016.1222520 (Last 
accessed: 29 Apr 2019). 
Kuzemko, Caroline & Hadfield, Amelia (2016), ”Defining and projecting EU energy 
policy”, ch. 1, pp.21-50 in Godzimirski, Jakub M. (ed.) (2016), EU Leadership in 
Energy and Environmental Governance, Palgrave Macmillan.  
Leal-Arcas, Rafael & Wouters, Jan (eds.) (2017), Research Handbook on EU Energy 
Law and Policy, Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781786431059 (Last accessed: 28 Apr 2019).  
Lelieveldt, Herman & Princen, Sebastiaan (2015), The Politics of the European 
Union, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Levi, Michael (2015), “Climate consequences of natural gas as a bridge fuel”, 
Climate Change, 118:3-4, pp. 609-623. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-012-0658-3 (Last accessed: 15 Mar 2019).  
Liakopoulos, Miltos (2011), ”Argumentation Analysis” in Bauer, Martin W. & 
Gaskel, George (eds.), Qualitative Researching with Text, Image and Sound, SAGE 
Publications Ltd: London, pp.153-171. Available at: 
https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781849209731 (Last accessed: 15 Mar 2019).  
Loskot-Strachota, Agata (2016), ”Nord Stream 2: policy dilemmas and the future of 
EU gas market”, NUPI Policy Brief, 2016-2. Available at: 
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2378856 (Last accessed: 30 Apr 2019).  
Loskot-Strachota, Agata, Bajczuk, Rafal & Kardas, Szyman (2018), ”Nord Stream 2 
divides the West”, OSW Commentary, number 273, 18 Jun 2018. Available at: 
101 
 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary_273.pdf (Last accessed: 
20 Apr 2019).  
Maass, Anna-Sophie (2017), EU-Russia relations, 1999-2015: From Courtship to 
Confrontation, Routledge: Abingdon, Oxon.  
Mandelson, Peter (2007), ”The EU and Russia: our joint political challenge”, Speech 
in Conference ”The Future relationship Between Russia and the European Union: 
Which kind of opportunities for the Italian Economy?”, Bologna, 20 Apr 2007. 
Available at: https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-07-242_en.pdf (Last 
accessed 3 May 2019).  
Markgren, Sarah (2018), ”Nord Stream 2 – A Pipeline Connecting Geopolitics and 
Geoeconomics?”, Master’s thesis, Swedish Defence University. Available at: 
http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1229509/FULLTEXT01.pdf (Last 
accessed: 30 Apr 2019).  
McCormick, John & Olsen, John Spencer (2014), The European Union: Politics and 
Policies, 5th ed., Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado. 
Meade, Robert & Zive, Joshua C. (2018), ”International Sanctions and the Energy 
Sector – Part 2: Russia”, The National Law Review. Available at: 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/international-sanctions-and-energy-
sector-part-2-russia (Last accessed: 30 Apr 2019). 
Mouraviev, Nikolai & Koulouri, Anastasia (eds.) (2019), Energy Security – Policy 
Challenges and Solutions for Resource Efficiency. Palgrave Macmillan. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01033-1 (Last accessed: 19 Mar 2019).  
Nord Stream (2019), “Our shareholders”. Available at: https://www.nord-
stream.com/about-us/our-shareholders/ (Last accessed: 5 May 2019). 
Permanent mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union (2016), 
“Russia-EU summits”. Available at: https://russiaeu.ru/en/russia-eu-summits 
(Last accessed: 30 Apr 2019).  
Pirani, Simon & Yafimava, Katja (2016), ”Russian gas transit across Ukraine post-
2019”, OIES paper: NG 105, Oxford. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.26889/9781784670542 (Last accessed: 29 Apr 2019). 
Richardson, Jeremy (ed.) (2012), Constructing a Policy-Making State?: Policy 
Dynamics in the EU, Oxford Scholarship online. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604104.001.0001; (Last accessed: 
18 Apr 2019).  
Schmidt, Vivien A. (2009), ”The EU and its Member States: From Bottom Up to Top 
Down” in Phinnemore, David & Warleigh-Lack, Alex (eds.), Reflections on European 
Integration, pp.194-211, Palgrave MacMillan: London. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230232839 (Last accessed: 20 Mar 2019).  
Schulte, Simon (2016), ”Nord Stream 2: Gazprom’s answer to a strategic 
disadvantage?”, Institute of Energy Economics, University of Cologne. Available at: 
102 
 
https://www.ewi.uni-koeln.de/en/nord-stream-2-gazproms-answer-to-a-
strategic-disadvantage/ (Last accessed: 19 Apr 2019). 
Sharples, Jack D. (2013), ”Russian approaches to energy security and climate 
change: Russian gas exports to the EU”, Environmental Politics, 22:4, pp.683-700. 
Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2013.806628 (Last accessed: 10 
Apr 2019). 
Siddi, Marco (2017a), National Identities and Foreign Policy in the European Union: 
The Russia Policy of Germany, Poland and Finland, ECPR Press: Colchester. 
Siddi, Marco (2017b), “The Southern Gas Corridor – challenges to a geopolitical 
approach in the EU’s external energy policy”, FIIA Briefing Paper 216. Available at: 
https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/the-southern-gas-corridor (Last accessed: 3 
May 2019). 
Stewart, Susan (2013), ”Germany”, ch. 2, pp.13-29 in David, Maxine, Gower, Jackie, 
& Haukkala, Hiski (eds.) (2013), National Perspectives on Russia: European Foreign 
Policy in the Making?, Routledge: London. 
Stritzel, Holger (2014), Security in Translation: Securitization Theory and the 
Localization of Threat, Palgrave Macmillan: London. Accessed at: 
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137307576 (Last accessed: 20 Apr 2019). 
Szulecki, Kacper (2016), ”European energy governance and decarbonization 
policy: learning from the 2020 strategy”, Climate Policy, 16:5, pp. 543-547. 
Available at:  https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2016.1181599 (Last accessed: 
20 Mar 2019). 
Szulecki, Kacper (ed.) (2018), Energy Security in Europe – Divergent Perceptions 
and Policy Challenges, Palgrave Macmillan. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64964-1 (Last accessed: 20 Apr 2019).  
Union of Concerned Scientists (n.d.), ”Environmental Impacts of Natural Gas”. 
Available at: https://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/coal-and-other-fossil-
fuels/environmental-impacts-of-natural-gas (Last accessed: 3 May 2019). 
United Nations (1991/2017), Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context, New York. Available at: 
https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2017/EIA/Publication/
1733290_pdf_web.pdf (Last accessed: 2 May 2019). 
Van Rees, M. Agnes (2007), ”Discourse analysis and argumentation theory: the case 
of television talk”, Journal of Pragmatics, 39, pp.1454-1463. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2007.04.005 (Last accessed: 16 Mar 2019). 
Vesrluis, Esther, van Mendeltje, Keulen & Stephenson, Paul (2011), Analyzing the 
European Union Policy Process, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, New York. 
103 
 
Whist, Bendik Solum (2008), “Nord Stream: Not just a pipeline”, FNI Report, 
15/2008. Available at: https://www.fni.no/getfile.php/132119-
1469870364/Filer/Publikasjoner/FNI-R1508.pdf (Last accessed: 30 Apr 2019).  
Whist, Bendik Solum (2009), “Nord Stream: A litmus test for intra-EU solidarity?”, 
Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook, pp.75-123. Available at 
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/119288/valispol7610.pdf#page=75 (Last accessed: 
30 Apr 2019).  
Vihma, Antto & Wigell, Mikael (2016), ”Unclear and present danger: Russia’s 
geoeconomics and the Nord Stream II pipeline”, Global Affairs, 2:4, pp.377-388. 
Available at https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2016.1251073 (Last accessed: 25 
Apr 2019). 
Wӕver, Ole (2005), “European integration and security: Analysing French and 
German discourses on state, nation, and Europe”, pp.33-67, in Howarth, David & 
Torfing, Jacob (eds.), Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and 
Governance, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke. 
Youngs, Richard (2014), ”A new geopolitics of EU Energy Security”, Carnegie 
Europe. Available at: https://carnegieeurope.eu/2014/09/23/new-geopolitics-of-
eu-energy-security-pub-56705 (Last accessed: 20 Apr 2019). 
Zhang, Xiaochun, Myhrvold, Nathan P., Hausfather, Zeke & Caldeira, Ken (2016), 
“Climate benefits of natural gas as a bridge fuel and potential delay of near-zero 
energy systems”, Applied Energy, 167, pp. 317-322. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2015.10.016 (Last accessed: 16 Mar 2019).  
 
